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Abstract 
The Effect of Transactive Memory and Collective Efficacy 
on Aircrew Performance 
by 
Daryl Raymond Smith 
Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee: 
Professor Terence R. Mitchell 
Department of Management and Organization 
The use of teams is becoming prevalent in American organizations. The United States 
Air Force for example, employs aircrew teams on the majority of their aircraft. This 
thesis focuses on system and motivational variables that influence the performance of 
aircraft teams. Two potentially important team variables are identified and examined in 
three research studies. Transactive memory is a system which combines the knowledge 
possessed by individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows what, 
who is good at what, and who does what. Collective efficacy is the group's collective 
belief that it can perform a specific task. This research tests these two constructs as 
competing constructs in explaining team performance. A laboratory and two field 
studies are conducted to determine the effects of transactive memory and collective 
efficacy on team performance. The results indicate that transactive memory has a 
consistent and positive relationship with performance across studies. However, the 
relationship failed to reach statistical significance due to small sample sizes. Change in 
the composition of the team due to turnover is shown to be detrimental to transactive 
memory. In addition, transactive memory makes important contributions to the team's 
collective efficacy. In operational environments. collective efficacy is significantly 
related to higher performance. A confident team is a more effective team. These results 
are discussed in terms of their theoretical and practical significance. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. iii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... .iv 
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................... · ............................................. 1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 3 
Teruns ............................................................................................................... 3 
Categories of Terun Variables_ ......................................................................... 4 
Trans active Memory - Theoretical Work ......................................................... 5 
Related Terms ................................................................................................... 8 
Transactive memory features .......................................................... · ................ 11 
Advantages and Disadvantages ...................................................................... 13 
Transactive Memory - Empirical Work .......................................................... 14 
Summary of Empirical Evidence .................................................................... 20 
Collective Efficacy -Theoretical Work .......................................................... 20 
Collective Efficacy - Empirical Work ........ , ................................................... 23 
The Relationship of Transactive memory and Collective efficacy ................. 25 
Chapter 3: Research Model and Hypotheses .................................................................. 28 
Chapter 4: Study 1: Flight Simulation ........................................................................... 33 
Methods .......................................................................................................... 33 
Overview ...................................... : ................................................................. 33 
Subjects .......................................................................................................... 33 
Design ............................................................................................................. 34 
Procedure and Task ........................................................................................ 35 
Measures ......................................................................................................... 36 
Results ............................................................................................................ 38 
Discussion of Study 1 ..................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 5: Study 2: Fairchild AFB ............................................................................... .47 
Methods .......................................................................................................... 47 
Overview ........................................................................................................ 47 
Subjects and Setting ......................................... · .............................................. 47 
Procedure and Task ........................................................................................ 48 
Measures ......................................................................................................... 49 
Results ............................................................................................................ 54 
Discussion of Study 2 ..................................................................................... 63 
-Chapter 6: Study 3: Altus AFB ...................................................................................... 69· 
Methods ............................................ .' ............................................................. 69 
Overview ........................................................................................................ 69 
Subjects and Setting .................................... · .... ~ .............................................. 69 
Procedure and Task ........................................................................................ 70 
Measures ......................................................................................................... 70 
Results ............................................................................................................ 73 
Discussion of Study 3 ..................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 7: Conclusion .................................................................................................... 87 
Overall Discussion· .......................................................................................... 87 
Practical Implications ..................................................................................... 88 
Limitations ...................................................................................................... 89 
Future Research Directions ............................................................................ 92 
Summary ......................................................................................................... 95 
References ....................................................................................................................... 97 
Appendix A: Training Checklist for the Pilot .................................................... ;; ........ 101 
Appendix B: Situational Awareness Measures ............................................................ 104 
Appendix C: Value of Communication Perception Measures ..................................... 105 
Appendix D: Performance Measures ............................................................................ 106 
Appendix E: Videotape Coding Form .......................................................................... 107 
Appendix F: Sample Crewmember Form Fairchild ..................................................... 109 
Appendix G: Sample Evaluator Form .......................................................................... 113 
Appendix H: Cover Letter ............................................................................................ 114 
Appendix I: Sample Crewmember Form Altus ............................................................ 115 
Vita ................................................................................................................................ 120 
ii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Number Page 
1: Transactive memory and collective efficacy; dual influ~nces on performance. 28 
2: Chart of Behavioral Analysis Items for Transactive Memory Videotape Rating 
Form. 38 
3: Interaction of Tech and Advisor Condition for the Confusion Variable 43 
4: A revised model of the transactive memory I collective efficacy process 65 
5: An illustration of how Crew Training Hardness totals were calculated. 71 
6: A revised model of the transactive memory I collective efficacy process. 83 
iii 
LIST OFT ABLES 
Number 
1. Subject's experience in various fighter aircraft 
2. Performance Data by Transactive memory Condition 
3. Situational Awareness by Transactive memory Condition for Pilots .. 
4. Situational Awareness by Transactive memory Condition for Advisors 
5. Perceptual Data from the Advisor's perspective 
6. Task Coordination Component by Transactive memory Condition 
7. Correlations between control and performance variables 
8. Correlations between flights and experience indicators 
9. Correlations between transactive memory components 
10. Partial correlations between T.M. components and performance 
11. Correlations between transactive memory components and crew hardness 
12. Correlations between squadron time and transactive memory components 
13. Correlations of squadron time with crew hardness and transactive memory 
14. Partial Correlations between collective efficacy and performance 
15. Results of the analyses for performance regressed onto collective efficacy 
after controlling for experience and ability 



















17. Correlations between transactive memory and collective efficacy controlling 
for experience and ability 62 
18. Correlations between collective efficacy and crew hardness and transactive 
memory components 63 
19. Correlations between control and performance variables 73 
20. Correlations between transactive memory ~omponents 75 
21. Partial correlations between T.M. components and performance 77 
22. Correlations between transactive memory and crew hardness 78 
23. Partial Correlations between collective efficacy and performance 79 
24. Collective efficacy levels at Altus and Fairchild 79 
25. Correlations between T.M. components and performance controlling for 
collective efficacy 80 
26. Correlations between control variables and collective efficacy 80 
27. Correlations between transactive memory and collective efficacy controlling 
for experience and ability. 81 
V 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The Book of James says that "every good and perfect gift comes down from above, from 
the Father of lights in whom is no variableness or shadow of turning". So I must first 
thank Almighty God who has given me the ability to think and reason and act in a 
purposeful manner and given me the grace to complete this project. I would like to 
thank Terry Mitchell whose input and conscientious efforts allowed this project to be 
completed in my three year time allotment. Terry you are a gifted individual and have 
been very helpful to me, thanks for caring. To Sally Fuller who is a breath of fresh air in 
the Business School. I appreciate how well you work with others and for your unique 
perspectives in this work. To John Miyamoto, John I always enjoyed your classes and 
you are equally a breath of fresh air for the Psychology Department. Thanks for caring 
for students and for me. I want to acknowledge the time that was sacrificed by my three 
wonderful children Ryan, Stephanie, and Andrew. My times with you at Ft. Lawton 
were the most carefree and enjoyable of my stint in school. I hope I didn't miss too 
many times that I shouldn't have. Finally, to Laura, one of the most wonderful women 
to ever walk this earth. Thanks for your support and patience in yet another project. I 
hope that soon, we will have less career obstacles to climb and more time for each other. 





The use of teams is becoming more prevalent in United States businesses. 
Osterman (1994) found that more than 50% of U.S. business organizations use teams. 
Within those, 40% report that over half of the company's employees work in teams. The 
military employs teams widely as well. The basic Army unit is the platoon. The Navy 
has SEAL teams and submarine crews, while the Air Force has multiple flight crews. 
Commensurate with this increased use of teams has been an increase of research on 
teams. The key words "teams" and "teamwork" resulted in 29 references in the Academy 
of Management Journal and Review since 1990. The number of references increased to 
54 when Administrative Science Quarterly and Journal of Applied Psychology were 
added. With the increased popularity of the use of teams, it is important as 
organizational behaviorists to understand what makes an effective team. To this end, 
theorists have identified several potentially important variables, including transactive 
memory and collective efficacy, which may separate the exceptional team from the 
average team. 
Transactive memory (Wegner, 1987) is a system which combines the knowledge 
possessed by individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows what, 
who is good at what, and who does what. Collective efficacy is the group's collective 
belief that it can perform a specific task (Lindsley, Mathieu, Heffner, Brass, 1994). Both 
of these constructs have been shown ro be positively related to team performance. 
However, the majority of the studies conducted have been confined to the laboratory. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of both transactive memory and 
collective efficacy in the performance of both nominal and natural occurring teams in 
both the laboratory and the field. 
In the following sections, I define key terms and variables and then present a 
brief history of both transactive memory and collective efficacy research. I review both 
theoretical and empirical work. The major focus is upon transactive memory with 
collective efficacy (the more well established construct) serving as a gauge of the 
effectiveness of transactive memory in the team - performance relationship. I then 
propose several hypotheses to extend our knowledge of the importance of transactive 
memory and collective efficacy as contributors to team performance. Next, I review a 
series of three studies to investigate these hypotheses. The first is a lab study using a 
PC-based simulator and actual military aviators working as a team to successfully 
complete a mission. Studies 2 and 3 are field tests of these constructs using KC-135 air 
refeuling aircraft crews at two different Air Force bases in order to determine if these 
constructs help to separate the exceptional from the average aircrew. The results and 
discussions of these three studies are presented in tum. In conclusion, the results of the 
three studies are compared and summarized and practical implications, as well as 







Teams Defined. What constitutes a team and does a team differ from a group? 
There are many definitions of a team, but I choose to use the following: " ... a 
distinguishable set of two or more individuals who interact dynamically, 
interdependently and adaptively to achieve specified, shared, and valued objectives" 
(Brannick, Roach, and Salas, 1993, p. 287). The emphasis on interdependence and 
interaction is what separates a team from a group. For example, a life insurance 
organization may have a sales group. There may be seven salespersons in the group who 
each independently seek out new insurance policies from individuals. If each of these 
persons independently acts in accomplishing his or her tasks, then this is best known as a 
"group" and not a "team". This label is used regardless of the fact that each individual 
may share the same building, have a cubicle in the same room, report to the same 
~upervisor, and be referred to as the "sales team" by the CEO. The fact that salespeople 
are not interdependent in accomplishing their tasks or objectives makes this a group. 
Contrast the sales group with the top management team (TMT) on a strategic planning 
retreat. This group including the Vice President of Sales. Finance, Accounting, 
Marketing, and the CEO. All act dynamically and interdependently in pursing valued 
and shared objectives (in this case setting strategic goals for the company). Probably the 
clearest example of a team is a coronary surgical unit. Each set of surgeons, doctors, and 
nurses acts dynamically and interdependently to accomplish an open heart surgery .. 
Interdependence is the key distinguishing feature of a team. Having distinguished the 
terms, they will be used interchangeably from this point forward. However, the use of 
the term group for this present study will be synonymous with the term "team" as 
defined above. 
While there has been much written on teams, Organizational Behaviorists have 
failed to give users of teams direction when assembling and monitoring teams (Church, 
1996). One reason for this oversight is the fact that teams, like diamonds, have many 
facets (e.g. demographics, size, leader vs. leaderless, processes, structure, development, 
boundaries, context). Theoretical work on teams has offered models of team 
effectiveness with associated categories of variables important for teams (Sundstrom, 
DeMeuse, Futrell, 1990; Goodman, Ravlin, Schminke, 1987). For the purposes of this 
proposal I will briefly cover some of the categories· of variables examined in the 
literature in order to provide a context for the constructs of interest. 
Categories of Team Variables 
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There have been many attempts to theoretically model team effectiveness 
(Goodman, et al., 1987; Sundstrom et al., 1990; Hackman, 1983). Campion, Medsker, 
and Higgs (1993) have gone a step further than others by not only presenting a 
theoretical framework for understanding team effectiveness, but by also testing the 
framework on diverse samples. They hypothesized that work team characteristics would 
be related to effectiveness. They found support for this hypothesis with both nonexempt 
administrative support jobs in a large financial services company (Campion et al., 1993) 
and exempt professional (knowledge worker) jobs in an insurance company (Campion, 
Papper, and Medsker, 1996). Their work is helpful in establishing a framework of team 
variables and thereby providing a context in which to understand the studies that follow. 
The categories of work team characteristics they studied are a follows: Job Design, 
Interdependence, Composition, Context, and Process. In the first study Campion et al. 
(1993) found that Job Design (e.g. self-management, participation, task variety, etc.) was 
the most important category of variables associated with team effectiveness. The second 
most important category of variables were Process variables (e.g. collective efficacy, and 
communication/ cooperation within the team). The Process category reflects those 
things that go on in the team to influence effectiveness. 
Interestingly, in the second study (Campion et al., 1996) the Process variables 
were found to be the most potent predictor of effectiveness of any category of variables 
(followed closely by Job Design). Relationships between Process characteristics and 
effectiveness criteria were even higher with the professional workers than they were for 
the nonexempt administrative workers. Campion et al. ( 1996) conclude by vigorously 
arguing that managers monitor and encourage positive team processes to increase team 
effectiveness. The manager must concentrate on the Process variables, especially if Job 
Design is not malleable. 
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Campion et al. ( 1996) highlight the importance of the Process category of team 
variables. The manager who wishes to enhance effectiveness should take heed. Within 
this category there seems to be at least two different types of variables at work. There is 
the idea of a network or a system (social support, communication, coordination) and the 
idea of motivation (group potency or collective efficacy). I will examine the idea that 
team motivation and team systems/networks are both important in team performance. I 
have selected one construct from each of these types for examination; transactive 
memory (a systems type construct) and collective efficacy (a motivational construct). 
These constructs are expanded upon in the following sections. 
Transactive Memory-Theoretical Work 
The roots of the construct transactive memory go back to an early and influential 
theory of group behavior known as the group mind (Wegner, 1987). Rousseau (1767) 
and Hegel ( 1807) assumed that groups, like individuals, had a form of mental activity 
that guides action. Many of the early pioneers (e.g. Wundt) who contributed to modem 
social psychology held this viewpoint (Wegner, 1987). Whereas group mind theorists 
had emphasized the similarity of individual minds as a hallmark of the group mind, 
transactive memory describes a social network of individual minds that transcends such 
uniform agreement. A transactive memory system connects disparate minds. It places 
direct emphasis on the social organization of diversity rather than on the social 
destruction of diversity (Wegner, 1987). It is important to emphasize that transactive 
memory is not a group mind in the sense of groupthink (Janis, 1972) or perhaps more 
accurately stated an overemphasis on agreement and lack of divergent opinions (Fuller & 
Aldag, 1998). Rather it is a linking of disparate minds in an attempt to process and 
structure information (Wegner, 1987). 
Wegner ( 1987) was the first to formally propose the construct of transactive 
memory, which was a fresh approach to the idea of a group mind. The group mind idea 
had been buried during the behavioral revolution of the 1930s (Wegner, 1987) and is 
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beginning to return to favor (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). The study of transactive 
memory has as its goal the prediction of group (and individual) behavior through an 
understanding of the manner in which groups process and structure information 
(Wegner, 1987). As first defined, a transactive memory system is a set of individual 
memory systems in combination with the communication that takes place between 
individuals (Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel, 1985). In sum, transactive memory is 
concerned with how a team acquires, stores, and handles information. 
The term memory is employed because the team must encode, store, and retrieve 
information as a group, just as in individual memory (Wegner, 1987). But, why the term 
transactive? 
The transactive quality of memory in a group is evident in the transactions 
that take place during encoding and retrieval. In transactive encoding, 
people discuss incoming information, determining where and in what 
form it is to be stored in the group ... the very nature of incoming 
information can be changed, translated into a form that the group can 
store. Transactive retrieval, in turn requires determining the location of 
information and sometimes entails the combination or interplay of items 
coming from multiple locations (Wegner, 1987, p. 190). 
Transactive memory uses an external memory system (Wegner, 1987). We store 
as much outside our minds as within them. There are two requirements for external 
memory. First there must be a label or retrieval cue (e.g. "Tom's phone number"). The 
second requirement of external memory is the location of the item ( e.g. "in the 
rolodex"). In contrast, internal encoding requires a label and the item. Therefore, other 
people can be locations of external storage for the individual. Another person can be 
used much like a library book. The book can be accessed for the information located 
within the volume. The interdependence produced by a transactive memory system 
produces knowledge-holding system that is larger and more complex than either of the 
individual's own memory systems (Wegner, 1987). 
Wegner ( 1987) goes on to elaborate on the features of transactive memory. First, 
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transactive memory is a property of the team. It is a constructed system which is built up 
over time by individual constituents. This construction is a fairly automatic consequence 
of social perception and interaction. Once in place, it can impact what the group as a 
whole can remember. In a nutshell, transactive memory is a group information-
processing system. 
A number of researchers have begun to study and theorize about transactive 
memory, led by Moreland (Moreland, Argote, Krishnan, 1998; Rulke & Rau, 1997; 
Moreland, Argote, Krishnan, 1996; Liang, Moreland, Argote, 1995; Wegner, Erber, 
Raymond, 1991). Moreland et al. (1998) have continued to develop this idea that people· 
supplant their own memories with external aids. Members of a team can use other 
members as a memory aid so that important information will not be forgotten (Wegner, 
1987). When individual members cannot remember a certain piece of information or are 
uncertain about the accuracy of such information, they can tum to another member for 
help. This transactive memory system combines the knowledge possessed by individual 
group members with a shared awareness of who knows what. 
The definition of transactive memory began to develop more fully with additional 
theoretical and experimental work. Liang et al. (1995) define transactive memory as " ... a 
combination of the knowledge possessed by particular group members and an awareness 
of who knows what" (p. 385). Moreland et al. ( 1996) use a similar definition, where the 
system combines the knowledge possessed by particular group members with a shared 
awareness of who knows what. However, they go a step further. They trace the 
development of transactive memory as a subset of a larger construct known as socially 
shared cognition (to be discussed later). They then infer that the shared knowledge of 
other group members would include "who is good at what" as well as "who knows 
what". Rulke and Rau (1997) make it explicit when they define transactive memory as 
the combination of the knowledge of particular group members combined with a shared 
awareness of who knows what and who is good at what. 
The above represents the present state of the construct definitionally. I would 
extend the definition one step further. Since transactive memory deals with the 
information between team members I would say it also includes "who does what''. This 
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information is vital to the effective operating of a team. Recall that the term "team" 
demands that the members be involved in interdependent tasks. For this interdependent 
cooperation to occur the team members must realize who does what. Task roles may be 
clearly defined (e.g. surgeon and nurse) in which case "who does what" is very clear. On 
the other hand, tasks may be ill-defined and situationally determined (e.g. a Navy SEAL 
team) whereby team members must determine "who does what". That brings us to the 
final definition of transactive memory which will be used in the remainder of/this 
proposal. Transactive memory is a system which combines the knowledge possessed by 
individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows what. who is good at 
what, and who does what in a team. 
Note the words, "combines the knowledge possessed by individual team 
members". The actual knowledge possessed by individual team members has been 
shown to be key in identifying expertise in the group. Transactive memory is more than 
a shared awareness; it also encompasses the individuals' knowledge, much like a library 
book on a shelf. It is important to know which library book to pull down, but it is also 
important for the library book to contain the knowledge. 
Related Terms 
Now that I have defined transactive memory, it may be helpful to differentiate it 
from related terms. In other words, what is transactive memory not? Transactive 
memory deals with knowledge among group members, however transactive memory is 
not the same as tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be 
articulated or codified very easily. This knowledge (usually) comes from direct 
experience (e.g. riding a bicycle) (Polanyi, 1958, 1962). The idea began in the 
evolutionary economics field and has been adapted by the organization theorists. It is a 
useful metaphor which has been applied across organizational levels (Nelson & Winter, 
1982). 
I see two key relations between tacit knowledge and transactive memory. First, 
the degree to which a transactive memory system is in place, may dictate how easily an 
organization can articulate or codify its routines. Routines are very important to 
organizations and most people discuss tacit knowledge in organizations in the 
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framework of routines. If a good transactive memory system is in place, it may be easier 
to codify the routine because people can identify where the information lies. Second, the 
fact that some knowledge is tacit makes transactive memory all the more important. If I 
can only know some things through direct experience, it is important then that I know 
''who knows what". I can't know everything, especially things learned through direct 
experience, but my teammates may possess that knowledge. 
As alluded to earlier, transactive memory is not some sort of group mind in the 
sense of groupthink (Janis, 1972). Groupthink in this context would refer to group 
unanimity, solidarity in thought and too strong a desire to avoid contradictory ideas or 
evidence. Recently, Fuller and Aldag ( 1998) have critiqued the concept of groupthink as 
it has been articulated by Janis (1972). They cite a lack of empirical support for the 
concept and propose that 'groupthink' as defined by Janis may not necessarily have 
negative outcomes. Regardless of the validity of the construct of groupthink, it should 
be clear that transactive memory is not referring to some type of groupthink construct 
Transactive memory does not refer to similarity of individual minds, but rather 
connections of disparate minds (Wegner, 1987). 
There are a slough of similar terms to transactive memory: shared mental models, 
team mental models, common cause maps. shared frames, teamwork schemas, and 
sociocognition (Klimoski & Mohammed. 1994). The work in this area is not well 
developed and therefore terms are often used interchangeable or without great precision. 
I will attempt to address many of these terms, while attempting to not get bogged down. 
The goal is a clear delineation of transactive memory from related terms. 
Weick and Roberts (1993) use the term collective mind. They focus on the 
collective mind as a system of behaviors which are heedfully interrelated. Their classic 
example is the aircraft carrier where sailors must work in coordination to conduct 
successful flight operations. "People act heedfully when they act more or less carefully, 
critically, consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly, conscientiously, 
perniciously" (Weick & Roberts, 1993. p. 361). People can vary to the degree in which 
they are heedful which directly relates to smooth operations or disasters. This is 
different from transactive memory which focuses on knowledge and memory location 
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and retention, while the collective mind focuses on behaviors and coordination. 
Gruenfeld and Hollingshead (1993) assert that cognition is beginning to be 
viewed as a collective rather than an individual phenomenon. They go on to say that 
transactive memory is evidence of this change in approach to cognition. Moreland, et al. 
( 1996) also conclude that cognition can occur as a collective phenomenon, they use the 
term socially shared cognition and place transactive memory as a particular type of 
socially shared cognition. Gruenfeld and Hollingshead (1993) employ the term, group 
sociocognition, which is "social interaction that leads to an emergence of unique, 
collectively produced conceptualizations that no individual has to begin with." Group 
sociocognition differs from transactive memory in that transactive memory is not so 
concerned about the production of information, but rather how the group stores and 
processes information among its members. However, it is clear that both of these 
constructs deal with information and knowledge. 
One of the most popular team research topics is team mental models (Klimoski & 
Mohammed. 1994). Different meanings are attached to this term and the seminal 
treatment of the topic by Klimoski and Mohammed ( 1994) does not even attempt to 
define it. However, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse (1993) have worked 
extensively with Navy teams and provide the following definition. Team mental models 
require that team members hold common or overlapping cognitive representations of 
task requirements, procedures, and role responsibilities. Klimoski and Mohammed 
( 1994) do define the generic term mental model as "a psychological representation of the 
environment and its expect behavior" (p. 405). So from these definitions we may deduce 
that transactive memory is a subset of team mental models, but not the same construct. 
Team mental models deal with not only with knowledge among team members, 
but also representations of tasks, situations. response patterns, the environment, and the 
environment's expected behavior (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Klimoski and 
Mohammed 1 1994) suggest that the content of mental models are theories of situations 
or of actions. So team mental models are focused on task behaviors and the environment 
much more so than transactive memory. Transactive memory deals primarily with who 
knows what. who is good at what, and who does what. It concerns itself with knowledge 
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( or information) held within the group and is not focused primarily outside of the group. 
The environment does supply incoming information into the group that the group must 
process, but again transactive memory focuses on information inside the group. Since 
team mental models are focused on certain tasks and how they interact with the 
environment, it would seem logical that an effective transactive memory system would 
be critical to an effective team mental model. Transactive memory would store the 
knowledge which would allo~ the team to interact with the task and environment. But 
again, team mental models encompass more than transactive memory systems, the 
environment and tasks. Admittedly, the lines between transactive memory and team 
mental models become blurred, but I am taking a "first cut" at separating the two. The 
field as a whole has not yet clearly delineated the two (or made an attempt to do so). 
Shared mental model is the final term to be discussed. Shared mental models 
may be defined as follows, " ... group members typically have some sort of organized 
knowledge structures relating to various aspects of the group's situation, such as their 
task, their environment, and their fellow group members" (Peterson, Mitchell, 
Thompson, Burr, 1996, p. 5). Again we see the notion that shared mental models deal 
not only with knowledge about fellow group members, but also about the task and the 
environment. This is what separates transactive memory from shared mental models. 
Transactive memory deals primarily with knowledge and information among group 
members and is focused within the group. Now that transactive memory has been clearly 
delineated, I return to the discussion of theoretical treatment of transactive memory. 
Transactive memory features 
How exactly is a transactive memory system constructed? It begins when 
individuals learn something about each others' domains of expertise (Wegner, 1987). 
Stereotypes are the default (Wegner. et al., 1991) and serve as the first building block, 
though they are not necessarily accurate. Over time conversation and observation allow 
members to discern with precision who is expert in what domain. This perception of 
relative expertise of self and others requires self-disclosure lWegner et al., 1991). The 
individual with the relevant expertise can become the storage tank for that knowledge. 
Knowledge of team member's access to information is also an important tool in building 
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transactive memory. Access to information can lead to responsibility for the 
information. If no one individual seems to "be the expert" and access to information is 
not clear, negotiated entries occur (Wegner et al, 1991). In negotiated entries one person 
agrees to accept responsibility for the information. Responsibility is key in building the 
transactive memory system, "the system can be built because individuals in a group 
accept responsibility for knowledge" (Wegner, 1987, p. 194). 
Rulke and Rau ( 1997) found support for the theoretical explanation for how 
transactive memory systems form. They found that early in group interactions on a new 
task, group members spent·a great deal of communication on declaring expertise and 
coordinating / planning. The information encoding process seems to consist of small 
spiral encoding cycles of question-expertise-coordination. 
In sum, Wegner (1987) asserts thaUhe person who will be the acknowledged 
location of a set of labeled knowledge will primarily established through expertise. 
Rulke and Rau' s ( 1997) work supports this contention. If no expertise is established the 
group will rely on circumstantial knowledge responsibility ( or individual access to 
information). Or, the group will fall back on how the knowledge has been encountered 
in the group ( e.g. the finance reports seem to come through Dave). Finally, if expertise 
and access are equal, the group must negotiate the entry to decide which individual will 
hold responsibility. "An effective team will not leave responsibility for information to 
chance" (Wegner, 1987, p. 192) 
Work on antecedents and consequences of transactive memory is in its infancy. 
Antecedents that have been proposed are mutual self-disclosure, frequent transaction and 
dialogue, time, communication, and checks and interventions ( e.g. teacher to student, 
"are you with me") (Wegner, 1987; Wegner, et al., 1991). Wegner (1987) proposed that 
satisfaction may be one consequence of a transactive memory. He reasoned that clear 
differentiation of expertise should in tum lead to satisfaction. Furthermore, a mature 
transactive memory system may be a sign of a successful team or relationship. 
Liang, et al. ( 1995) theorized that a developed transactive memory system should 
be exhibited by three key behavioral features. In other words, the knowledge of "who· 
knows what" could be exhibited through three behaviors. From the behaviors, it can be 
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inferred that a strong transactive memory system exists (Moreland, et al., 1998). The 
first feature is memory differentiation which is the tendency of group members to 
specialize in remembering distinct aspects of the task. Secondly, a developed transactive 
memory system should result in task coordination where group members work smoothly 
together on a task (e.g. greater cooperation, less confusion, etc.) Finally developed 
transactive memory systems should exhibit high task credibility where group members 
trust one another's knowledge about the task ( e.g. few challenges to declared expertise). 
Two studies have shown support for these key features (Liang et al, 1995; Moreland et 
al, 1996). 
Moreland et al. (1998) also theorized that teams with developed transactive 
memory systems will reflect three (knowledge) indices concerning their belief system 
about group member expertise. They assert that teams with transactive memory will 
exhibit a complexity of beliefs about expertise. These teams will also show a higher 
level of accuracy of those beliefs and a high level of agreement among team members 
concerning those beliefs. Conversely a team with little or no transactive memory will 
have a simple and incomplete set of beliefs concerning expertise. These beliefs will not 
be accurate nor will they exhibit high levels of agreement. Moreland et al. ( 1998) 
provide one study as empirical support for these knowledge indices. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
Wegner ( 1987) enumerates several potential benefits of transactive memory. 
First he points out the integration of knowledge: useful creative products can be 
produced by transaction--they help manufacture new knowledge for the group. This is 
similar to Gruenfeld and Hollingshead' s ( 1993) idea of group sociocognition. 
Transactive memory also allows individual team members to gain access to new areas of 
expertise. Finally, others in the group may 'catch', (i.e. note, acquire, and store) 
incoming information that any one individual may miss, ensuring it is available for 
future team use. 
There are also several drawbacks to a strong transactive memory system 
(Wegner. 1987). Errors can occur at all three stages of group information processing; 
encoding. storage. and recall. Obviously this occurs at an individual level as well. but 
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can be compounded by group level errors. There is also a potential new source of error, 
incomplete specification of knowledge path responsibility (i.e. where this knowledge is 
to be stored and who is responsible for it). Information may be inadvertently channeled 
away from the expert, however this is more likely under a developing and immature 
transactive memory system. Overconfidence can lead to an over estimation of its 
capability by group members (i.e. trust that someone else has the information, when they 
do not). Finally, and I think most importantly for organizations, a strong transactive 
memory system infers that turnover can have grave effects. When a person leaves the 
team, they depart with that store of knowledge leaving a gap in the transactive memory 
system. 
Transactive Memory - Empirical Work 
Since transactive memory is a relatively new construct, little empirical work has 
been done. For this reason the entire body of empirical work to date will be 
summarized. 
Wegner (1987) began transactive memory work on dating couples. He studied 
recall in dating couples. Subjects were asked for area of expertise for self and partner; 
The individuals then viewed items for either one minute or 30 seconds. This resulted in 
a 2 X 2 design (Expertise--partner/self and Circumstantial Responsibility--partner/self). 
Self expertise led to the greater number of remembered items, which is no surprise. 
However, when subjects were circumstantially responsible for a topic (i.e. allowed 
greater viewing time) they remembered more when they believed their partner was not 
an expert in that topic. When they considered their partner an expert they "let the 
information pass by" assuming that .the partner would pick it up. This provides evidence 
that expertise seems to indicate where knowledge will be stored in the transactive 
memory system. 
Wegner's (1987) first study dealt with intact couples. He and his colleagues 
(Wegner et al.. 1991) extended the study by comparing recall in intact ( or natural) 
couples versus those put together simply for the study (i.e. impromptu couples). They 
also manipulated expertise by either assigning expertise (or responsibility, without 
regard to actual expertise) or not assigning expertise. This resulted in a 2 X 2 design as 
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well (Pairs--natural or impromptu and Expertise--assigned or none). They found an 
effect of expertise, natural couples remembered more than impromptu couples with no 
assignment. Impromptu couples remembered more than natural couples with 
assignment. There was also an interaction, natural couples without assignment 
remembered more than with assignment. In impromptu couples there was no difference 
in assignment mode (assignment was non-significantly greater). 
Wegner et al. ( 1991) drew several conclusions from this study. First, for 
assignment to improve memory performance in teams, it may require time and practice. 
The assignment did help improve memory in impromptu couples, but it did not reach 
statistical significance. The finding that assignment of expertise or responsibility 
(regardless of expertise) was interesting. Natural couples without assignment 
remembered significantly more than with assignment. It seems that items which fall 
within the domain of expertise where given less than the usual attention, why? Perhaps 
new assignment introduces uncertainty, or new assignment may introduce 
overconfidence to ignore usual items. Perhaps, assignment interrupts the flow of 
normally fluid cognitive processes. Wegner et al. (1991) called for further research into 
the time and course of transactive memory development. It does seem clear that 
imposing artificial structure into a natural team is counterproductive. While assignment 
of structure to newly formed teams may be helpful. 
Rulke and Rau ( 1997) answered this call for further research. They used a 
laboratory study of undergraduates who were trained as individuals or in groups. The 
task was the construction of an AM radio. One week after initial training, the subjects 
again assembled a radio for the criterion trials. The training groups remained intact and 
the individually trained subjects were put into groups for the radio assembly. Subject's 
interaction was videotaped and later coded and analyzed. Expertise was found to be key 
to transactive memory systems. Declaring expertise and coordinating/ planning were 
found to be the largest categories of sentences spoken. Declaring expertise and acquiring 
information about a domain of expertise took place during the earlier rather than later 
periods of group interaction. Category of sentences spoken was influenced by category 
spoken in previous periods. The encoding process seems to cons"ist of small spiral 
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encoding cycles of question-expertise-coordination. The results of the study "suggest 
that transactive memory is developed when shared experience is present and through an 
transactive encoding process" (Rulke & Rau, 1997). The results also give direct support 
to Wegner's (1987) hypothesis that discovery of expertise is a primary vehicle to the 
. encoding of transactive memory. 
Moreland and his colleagues have been involved with a serious of laboratory 
studies to investigate transactive memory (Liang et al, 1995; Moreland et al, 1996; 
Moreland et al., 1998). Their studies have been centered around two general hypotheses 
(Moreland et al, 1998). One is that groups will perform better when their members are 
trained together rather than apart. Two, the benefits of such training will depend largely 
on the operation of transactive memory systems. Training people in groups allows the 
interaction, self-disclosure, and communication necessary to build transactive memory 
systems (Wegner et al., 1991). 
All three of the Moreland studies utilized the AM radio assembly task employed 
by Rulke and Rau (1997). Liang et al. (1995) compared teams originally trained as 
individuals versus teams that were trained as teams. Through direct performance 
measures (e.g. number of errors in assembly, procedural recall) it was clear that teams 
trained as a group performed better. Meanwhile, videotape recording and analysis 
revealed that teams trained together exhibited better memory differentiation, task 
coordination, and task credibility. From these behavioral features, it was concluded that 
such teams had stronger transactive memory systems. Regression analysis revealed that 
group training improved group performance primarily through transactive memory 
systems. Control variables included task motivation, group cohesion, and social identity. 
These control variables did not effect the training - performance relationship. This was 
the first study to demonstrate transactive memory with more than two people. 
The next study in the series was nearly identical to the first (Moreland et al., 
1996) an~ was designed to rule out alternative explanations (i.e. those other than 
transactive memory) for the results in study one. The second study employed four 
groups of training: individual. team-building, ·re-assignment, and integral team. In the 
individual condition, subjects were trained on the radio task individually and tested in a 
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group one week later. The second condition was identical to the individual condition, 
except that after the individual training session, groups were formed and participated in a 
short team building exercise ( to develop a mentoring quiz for seniors to use during 
freshman orientation). This exercise was used to encourage group development without 
providing information about "who knows what". 
The group training condition (integral team) was identical to study one (Liang et 
al., 1995). A new condition was identical to the group training condition except that 
subject teams were unexpectedly scrambled one week later. The researchers again found 
that the group training condition produced the highest performance (the other conditions 
did not differ) and that this performance difference was due to transactive memory. For 
example, assembly errors were reduced by 50% in the group training condition. Memory 
differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility were all higher for the group 
training condition. 
Evidence for transactive memory in the first two Moreland studies relied upon 
the inference of transactive memory as a result of the three behavioral indications of 
memory differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility. Study 3 (Moreland et al., 
1998) was designed to more directly tap the knowledge inherent in a developed 
transactive memory system. The researchers wanted to get at exactly what team 
members know about one another. This study used similar procedures to the previous 
studies and employed two training conditions (group or individual). Subjects were then 
brought back the next week. Subjects were then given a knowledge questionnaire 
(discussed below) to assess their knowledge of other group members. Next subjects 
completed a procedural recall sheet and then assembled a radio. However, contrary to 
what they had been told in week one (and was done in the other two studies) this recall 
sheet and subsequent assembly of the radio was done individually rather than in a group. 
This was done in order to actually assess individual member's knowledge of radio 
assembly procedures. 
The knowledge questionnaire was used to produce three indices for each group. 
The complexity of group member's beliefs about one another's radio expertise; the 
accuracy of those beliefs; and the level of agreement within a group about the 
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distribution of expertise. As hypothesized, members whose groups were trained together 
rather than apart had significantly greater complexity, accuracy, and agreement in their 
knowledge of other group members. This is direct evidence that group training helps to 
develop transactive memory systems. Furthermore, the researchers found that these 
direct measures (i.e. knowledge indices) of transactive memory were positively and 
significantly correlated with the behavioral ( or indirect) evidence of transactive memory 
(i.e. memory differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility). 
Though technically it was not transactive memory as defined in this present 
proposal, Peterson et al.'s (1996) study on shared mental models (and group efficacy) 
sheds some light on transactive memory. The researchers studied student groups 
working on quarter-long research projects. They found that both group efficacy and 
shared mental models predicted performance (measured as the final grade). Specifically 
it was early group efficacy and shared mental models late in the quarter which predicted 
performance in the longitudinal study. Furthermore, the predictors were not independent 
of each other. Early group efficacy predicted later shared mental models which in tum 
predicted performance. What is interesting is that the researcher's operationalization of 
shared mental models was information-centered, making it very similar to transactive 
memory. 
Peterson et al. (1996) assessed shared mental models through a set of knowledge 
type questions. Individuals in each team were asked to distribute points to each group 
member on how much they contributed to the five task components of the project. This 
Disagreement over contributions score can be thought of as "who does what". Egotism 
was measured for each group as well to determine the extent to which group members 
inflated their contributions. Again, this is a measure of "who does what". One would 
expect that teams with better transactive memory systems would have higher agreement 
on "who does what". A second shared mental model measure was used to rate the 
importance of each of the five task components in order to produce an outstanding final 
project. High level of agreement on this measure would indicate a shared awareness of 
"who knows what", in this case, do we all know what is important? Groups with well 
developed transactive memory systems should have high agreement on this score as well. 
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Again, groups with better shared mental models (similar to transactive memory) late in 
the quarter, produced better final projects. Shared mental models (or transactive 
memory) was hypothesized to improve performance by improving group coordination. 
This idea is supported by the work of Liang et al. ( 1995). One of their behavioral indices 
of the presence of transactive memory, task coordination, was found to be related to 
higher performance. 
The closest that transactive memory empirical work has come to examining 
natural teams in a field setting is Hollingshead's (1998) recent work with clerical office 
workers. Hollingshead used clerical workers from a large university in a word 
memorization task of work related words in a lab study. She found that subjects learn 
and recall more information in their own areas of expertise when their partner had 
different, rather than similar, work-related expertise. Furthermore, this effect reverses 
for recall of information outside work-related expertise. These findings are similar to 
Wegner et al.'s (1991) work with dating couples. 
Though all the subjects were clerical workers, the workers were placed in 
nominal teams by the researcher. This was done to manipulate the expertise of the 
others on the team. This work was conducted as a lab study. However in addition to the 
lab study, Hollingshead also surveyed workers concerning their own natural work 
groups. The survey measured various items including group tenure and group size. The 
survey also included a self report of the extent to which participants knew about each of 
their coworker's areas of work-related knowledge and job responsibilities (seven-point 
scale); and the extent to which there was shared agreement in their work group about 
members' work-related expertise and job responsibilities (seven-point scale). 
Hollingshead then correlated the self-reports with the predictor variables of group tenure 
and size. Results indicate that group size is negatively correlated with knowing about 
other group member's expertise as hypothesized. In contradiction to another hypothesis, 
it was found that tenure was negatively correlated with perceived agreement in their 
work group about members' expertise and job responsibilities. This was the first attempt 
to examine natural teams. Though a step in the right direction, the study suffered from 
common method variance. with the participant rating both the predictor and criterion 
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variables. Furthermore, these findings were based on the reports of only one person 
from the natural team. 
Summary of Empirical Evidence 
So in sum, what do we know empirically about transactive memory? We know 
that it has been exhibited in laboratory studies (Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1991; 
Liang et al., 1995; Moreland et al., 1996; Rulke & Rau, 1997; Moreland et al., 1998). 
All of the studies have used undergraduate students and have been limited to memory 
recall or completion of the same complex task (i.e. radio assembly). Transactive 
memory has been exhibited in pairs (Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1991) or in teams of 
three (Moreland et al., 1998). Transactive memory has been exhibited directly by 
memory recall in dating couples (Wegner, 1987), indirectly through behavioral indices 
(Liang et al., 1995; Moreland et al., 1996), and directly through knowledge indices 
(Moreland·et al., 1998). Rulke and Rau (1997) and Wegner et al. (1991) have 
demonstrated that the recognition of expertise seems key to the transactive memory 
process and that transactive memory seems to develop through interactions over time. 
There has been little or no research in the following areas. There has been no 
field studies or simulations used to test transactive memory. Transactive memory has 
not been tested on groups of more than three people and little has been done with natural 
teams. Transactive memory has not been tested when roles are well-defined, though 
Wegner et al. (1991) did impose artificial structure that could be remotely related to 
roles. The effect of turnover was examined in passing (Moreland et al., 1996), but 
nothing is known of its effects on transactive memory in well-developed teams over 
time. A related turnover issue is one of teams that are reconstituted (formed and 
reformed) on a regular basis. Clearly there are many issues to be explored in the 
transactive memory field. 
Collective Efficacy - Theoretical Work 
The decade of the 1990s has brought considerable interest in the construct of 
collective efficacy. The term has roots in Bandura's work in self efficacy (Bandura, 
1977, 1986). Bandura ( 1977) originally defined self efficacy as, "the conviction that one 
can successfully execute the behavior required to produce (particular) outcomes." Wood 
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·and Bandura (1989) later added that self efficacy refers to beliefs in one's capabilities to 
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and course of action needed to meet given 
situational demands. Bandura ( 1982) proposed that efficacy may also operate at the 
group level and since that time researchers have strived to understand its relationship to 
group performance. By 1997, Bandura asserted that indeed efficacy does operate at the 
. group level and has similar sources, serves similar functions, and operates through 
similar processes as does self efficacy. 
Researchers have used a number of terms centered around this idea of member's 
beliefs about the group: collective efficacy, group efficacy, collective or group esteem, 
group potency, and group aspiration level (Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, 1993; Lindsley et al. 
1994; Mischel & Northcraft, 1997; Little & Madigan, 1994; Gibson, 1996). 
Unfortunately these terms have often been used loosely, with little precision. Lindsley et 
al. (1994) do a good job in delineating between the terms. They define collective 
efficacy as the group's collective belief that it can successfully perform a specific task. 
Note, they assert that collective efficacy is task specific. In contrast, with group 
aspiration level, group members urianimously agree on a specific performance target. 
The aspirations are exact statements of performance goals rather than cognitive beliefs 
about the group's capability to accomplish particular levels of performance.· Group 
esteem is the extent to which individual's generally evaluate their social group 
positively. It is a more global concept than task-specific collective efficacy, and refers to 
the value of the group rather than the group's expected effectiveness in performing a 
task. Group potency is a group's shared belief that it can be effective. It is a more 
generalized belief in effectiveness than collective efficacy. Potency reflects a general 
assessment of the likely effectiveness of the team across situations, whereas team 
efficacy reflects shared performance expectations for a relatively specific situation. 
Potency is meant to refer to a shared belief about general effectiveness across multiple 
tasks encountered by groups in compiex environments. 
This study is concerned with the construct of collective efficacy. Though not 
always done in the literature, I wish to delineate between collective and group efficacy. 
Mischel and Northcraft (1997) define the term collective efficacy as an individual's 
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belief that his/her group or team can execute a task successfully. Individual beliefs are· 
aggregated to determine collective efficacy. Gibson ( 1996) defines group efficacy as the 
group's collective estimate (as a consensus) regarding the group's ability to perform a 
task objective. I will follow their lead and use the terms in this manner. 
There has been great debate over whether efficacy should be measured at the 
individual or group level (Gibson, 1996). In other words, should individual member's 
efficacy beliefs concerning the group be aggregated or should the group reach a 
consensus on efficacy level? Some researchers assert that either method is fine because 
both predict performance (Peterson et al, 1996; Guzzo et al., 1993). Others (Mischel & 
Northcraft, 1997) urge adoption of the aggregate collection of individual beliefs 
concerning group efficacy. The ratings are done individually and the referent is the 
group. They prefer this method because individual beliefs drive and direct individual 
effort and they assert that aggregation is a better predictor than consensus. Gibson 
(1996) counters that consensus is a more appropriate method because it more accurately 
reflects an attribute of the group, and group efficacy is a group level construct. 
The danger in using the group efficacy consensus approach is the possibility of 
the group arriving at a "politically correct" answer (Guzzo et al., 1993). In other words, 
the group tendency to present a socially desirable answer in response to a set of demand 
characteristics. The subject pool in this proposed study could be particularly prone to 
these socially desirable answers. Air Force members are taught to present a confident air 
and bravado. High goals are expected as reflected in the Air Force motto, "Aim High". 
I feel that this may compromise the validity of a group efficacy measurement. An 
anonymous individual collective efficacy estimate is one way to avoid this pitfalL 
Furthermore. collective efficacy has been shown to be more predictive of performance 
than group efficacy (Mischel & Northcraft. 1997). In light of these issues, collective 
efficacy will be used in this research and the method of aggregation of individual 
responses will be used to determine it. 
In sum. collective efficacy gets at the task confidence of the group, while 
transactive memory gets at the knowledge within the group. Collective efficacy is the 
group's collective belief that it can successfully perform a specific task. Transactive 
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memory is a system which combines the knowledge possessed by individual team 
members with a shared awareness of who know what, who is good at what, and who 
does what. These are clearly different constructs. However, it may be that high 
transactive memory could contribute to higher collective efficacy. A team where 
individuals realize who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what may feel 
more confident about task accomplishment. This idea is alluded to by Mischel and 
Northcraft ( 1997). 
Collective Efficacy - Empirical Work 
Collective efficacy research has demonstrated that collective efficacy exists as a 
group attribute and that it predicts performance (Bandura, 1997). Collective efficacy has 
been shown to be a predictor of performance in large organizations such as elementary 
schools (Bandura, 1993). Staff member's collective efficacy concerning their ability to 
motivate and educate students was strongly related to the school's academic 
performance. The staffs collective efficacy was more important in predicting academic 
performance than was the student body composition (socioeconomic status and racial 
composition). 
At the team level collective efficacy has also been shown to be an powerful 
predictor of performance for both sports (Hodges and Carron, 1992) and work (Little & 
Madigan, 1994) teams. Little and Madigan ( 1994) studied eight manufacturing teams of 
twelve employees each over an 1$ month period. These were self-managed work teams 
in a continuous manufacturing plant. Through surveys and structured interviews, it was 
found that collective efficacy was highly correlated with mean performance ratings made 
· by independent line leaders. 
These studies have clearly demonstrated a collective efficacy - performance 
linkage. Others (Knight, Durham, Locke, 1996; Gibson, 1996) have examined possible 
mediators or moderators of this relationship. One of more established constructs in the 
prediction of performance is goal setting. Knight et al. ( 1996) studied the relationship of 
goal setting, strategic risk, and collective efficacy (they use the term team efficacy) using 
88 3-person teams in a computer tank simulation. Controlling for ability, teams with 
higher collective efficacy chose harder goals, which led to riskier strategies and higher 
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performance. Goals set by the team were strongly influenced by collective efficacy. So 
it seems that collective efficacy may translate into higher performance through higher set 
team goals. In addition, performance feedback is an important component of goal 
setting. Prussia and Kinicki ( 1996) demonstrated that the impact of performance 
feedback on group brainstorming performance operated entirely through its effect on 
collective efficacy and affective reactions. 
Gibson ( 1996) cleverly examined cultural differences in the collective efficacy -
performance relationship by studying U.S. and Indonesian nursing teams and simulations 
using U.S. and Hong Kong management teams. Gibson found that task interdependence, 
collectivism and differentiation (how we seek for information - either self-reliance or 
looking to others) moderate the collective efficacy - performance relationship. When 
task interdependence is high, higher collective efficacy was related to higher 
performance. This relationship disappeared under conditions of low task 
interdependence (where the task does not require teamwork). Collective efficacy seems 
to be more effective for those high in collectivism. Furthermore, for those that tend to 
look to others for information, higher collective efficacy led to higher performance. 
Whereas, for those that look to self for information, higher collective efficacy led to 
lower performance. Gibson was the first to show that under certain conditions higher 
collective efficacy can actually lead to lower performance. She hypothesizes that this 
occurs when the team high in collective efficacy refuses to look to others for 
information. 
Perhaps the study which is most germane to the work presented here was 
conducted by Lindsley et al. (1994). They had 54 two-member teams complete a series 
of six preprogrammed ten-minute missions on a PC-based combat jet simulator. 
Collective efficacy and potency were assessed using survey measures along with 
objective indices of team task performance. They found that collective efficacy and 
potency (a more global confidence score as described earlier) were distinguishable 
constructs and that performance related more significantly with efficacy than potency. 
Collective efficacy was found to have a significant positive influence on performance 
development. Additionally, performance related significantly to subsequent collective 
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efficacy levels. 
In sum, empirical research has supported the idea that collective efficacy predicts 
performance (Bandura, 1997, 1993; Little & Madigan, 1994; Hodges & Carron, 1992; 
Lindsley et al. 1994). Under certain conditions, goal setting may mediate the collective 
efficacy -performance relationship. Additionally, cultural factors such as collectivism 
can moderate the relationship. Collective efficacy predicts performance, but is also 
effected by previous performance (Lindsley et al., 1994) and performance feedback 
(Prussia & Kinicki, 1996) 
The Relationship of Transactive memory and Collective efficacy. 
What is the potential relationship between transactive memory, collective 
efficacy, and performance? One potential link is that collective efficacy may lead to 
transactive memory. This seems to be what Peterson et al. ( 1996) found in their work on 
collective efficacy and shared mental models. Early group efficacy led to a higher level 
of mental models later in the quarter which in tum predicted group performance. 
Though not exactly the same construct as transactive memory, Peterson et al.'s (1996) 
measurement of mental models shared many similar characteristics with transactive 
memory. Specifically the group's shared mental models focused on items like "who 
knows what" and "who does what". Peterson et al.'. s ( 1996) teams had no previous 
history with one another before the beginning of the study (i.e. the academic quarter) and 
little history before the first measurement of efficacy and mental models. It seems 
unlikely that a team with little or no prior history could have developed mental models 
(or transactive memory), which would predict collective efficacy later in the quarter. 
More likely it seems that transactive memory and other factors lead to collective 
efficacy. First, intuitively we suspect that experience and ability lead to greater collective 
efficacy. Theoretically, Mischel and Northcraft (1997) assert that there are two 
components of collective efficacy: 1) Collective Task Efficacy and 2) Collective 
Interdependence efficacy. Collective task efficacy is the team member's estimation of 
whether they have the KSAs necessary to perform the task. Certainly, if a group does 
not feel they have the ability and experience necessary to provide the KSAs for the task, 
collective efficacy would suffer. The Air Force focuses a great deal of effort and 
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attention on proper flight training. Anecdotally, the airline industry prefers to hire ex-
military aviators, primarily due to their outstanding training, experience, and discipline. 
It would seem clear that most aircrew teams would feel that they have the necessary 
KSAs to perform the task (i.e. collective task efficacy). Mischel and Northcraft's second 
component, Collective Interdependence efficacy, concerns the issue of the team 
possessing the KSAs necessary to work together to accomplish the task. Though not as 
concentrated as the aviation skills training, the Air Force has established a program 
(referred to as Crew Resource Management or CRM) in order to provide aircrews' with 
the KSAs necessary to work effectively as a team. 
The seeds of collective efficacy lie in Bandura's (1982) work on self-efficacy. It 
is reasonable to assume that many principles of self efficacy translate directly to the 
group level as Bandura (1997) asserts. Bandura asserts that four categories of experience 
help to develop self efficacy. The primary and most important is what Bandura refers to 
as enactive mastery. Enactive mastery consists of previous personal attainments. It is 
clear that experience and ability are an integral part of those previous personal 
attainments. 
Enactive mastery and other categories of experience provide informational cues 
for the three types of assessment processes used to form self efficacy (Gist and Mitchell, 
1992). One of the assessments involved is the assessment of personal ( or team) and 
situational resources/constraints. Again, assuming self efficacy processes operate at the 
group level. the team assesses whether they have the resources (including the KSAs) 
necessary to successfully complete the task in view of the constraints of the situation. A 
team that is lacking the necessary abilities and experience is unlikely to have a positive 
assessment of their resources and, therefore, will likely have a lower state of collective 
efficacy. In sum, it seems that experience and ability have an important theoretical role 
in the dewlopment of collective efficacy. 
What other theoretical processes help to develop collective efficacy besides 
ability and experience? It appears that a well developed transactive memory system will 
provide a solid basis for formation of high collective efficacy. A case may be made for 
this assertion. using the theoretical approaches just touched upon. 
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Transactive memory is a knowledge system of who knows what, who does what, 
and who is good at what. This knowledge system would be very helpful in assessing 
Mischel and Northcraft's (1997) two components of collective efficacy. Does the team 
have the KSAs to perform the task (collective task efficacy) and more importantly does 
the team possess the KSAs to work together effectively (interdependence efficacy)? 
Being aware of who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what would allow 
team members to more confidently assess these two components. 
Furthermore, it would seem that a higher level of transactive memory would 
allow the team to have a better sense of Bandura's (1982) enactive mastery. A team that 
has been together, worked together, and thus developed a transactive memory system 
should have more enactive mastery to draw upon. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a well developed system of transactive 
memory would greatly enhance a team's ability to assess team and situational 
resources/constraints. A team that has been together and worked on a task together in 
the past; would have a more accurate gauge with which to judge team and situational 
resources/constraints. Transactive memory should be invaluable in this respect. If these 




Research Model and Hypotheses 
Given the above literature review, I now propose an overall theoretical model 
which will serve as the impetus for the hypotheses. Figure 1 depicts the model. The 
model is to be tested on both nominal and actual teams with clearly defined roles. The 
teams will be composed of two or more members. The relationships depicted should be 
evident in both the lab and the field. 
Turnover in training 
Time in the organization 7 Transactive memory 
71 
Turnover in composition 
Collective efficacy 
1' 
Experience and Ability 
Performance 
71 
Figure 1. Transactive memory and collective efficacy; dual influences on performance. 
The model depicts how two types of Process variables (Campion et al., 1996) can 
influence team performance. The first is a systems/network variable, transactive 
memory. Important inputs that influence the development of transactive memory are 
shown. Turnover in team training and/or team composition should negatively influence 
the development of transactive memory. Additionally, time in an organization should 
enhance the development of transactive memory systems. Transactive memory in tum 
should positively influence team performance. The second Process variable is a 
motivational one, collective efficacy. Experience and ability are important inp~ts into 
collective efficacy, as well as team performance. Collective efficacy and transactive 
memory are both thought to positively influence team performance. 
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The specific background for the particular studies conducted in this current 
dissertation come from the work of Moreland et al. ( 1998). These scholars call for 
additional research on natural work groups to confirm laboratory transactive memory 
findings. They suggest that research on natural work groups might involve archival or 
field studies and could be experimental or correlational in form. Information on 
transactive memory systems could be obtained through self-report or observational data 
and those data could then be correlated with various measures of group performance. 
They go on to suggest that particularly fruitful work may be done in organizations that 
vary in group training techniques by examining what effects these differences have on 
transactive memory systems and group performance. 
The present studies are patterned after many of Moreland et al.' s ( 1998) 
suggestions. The present studies seek to extend empirical transactive memory research 
into several unexplored areas. This exploration should in tum either support or question 
the theoretical work to date. Thus far, theoretical work has exceeded empirical work. 
Furthermore. the influence of transactive memory will be compared to the more 
established construct of collective efficacy in an attempt to set up competing models to 
explain team performance. The model in Figure 1 suggests that both transactive memory 
and collective efficacy will influence performance separately. Results will shed light on 
which of the two constructs is the most powerful predictor. In order to e:x.tend Moreland 
et al.' s ( 1998) empirical work, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
Hypothesis 1: Teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform teams 
with lower levels of transactive memory. 
A number of team characteristics have not been examine.ct in relation to 
transactive memory. These characteristics were touched upon in the beginning of this 
chapter. One issue to be addressed is the degree to which transactive memory systems 
have an effect on performance when roles are more clearly defined. In all of the studies 
using the AM radio assembly task. roles were left undefined by the experimenters. Each 
group defined its own roles during assembly. Only one transactive memory study has 
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attempted to address anything related to tearri roles. Wegner et al. (1991) imposed a 
structure (by assigning expertise) as one of their experimental conditions. In this case, 
the imposed structure harmed performance in natural couples who already had an 
established expertise structure in place. The imposed structure improved performance in 
impromptu couples, but not significantly. Imposing structure on the team (by assigning 
expertise) could be viewed as defined roles. It would seem that well defined roles would 
lessen the need for a mature transactive memory system. If a transactive memory system 
is "who knows what, who is good at what, and who does what" then roles answer these 
questions to a degree. For example in a police SW AT team, the sniper is the one who 
knows about long range shooting, he is the one who is good at long range shooting, and 
he does the long range shooting. However, even with well defined positions, certain 
tasks may not be "position specific". Returning to the SWAT team, one of several 
officers may be the expert in weapon maintenance. 
Do transactive memory systems operate in teams of greater than three 
individuals? It seems clear that teams of two and three do develop such systems. It 
would seem logical that with increased group membership size, the importance of 
transactive memory would increase as well. As more members are added it may be 
harder to determine "who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what". On 
the other hand, there is much more information available to the group by the sheer 
presence of more disparate minds. It would be helpful to identify expertise so that 
information could be smoothly funneled to the expert. The greater numbers also bring a 
greater challenge to group coordination and cohesion. Well developed transactive 
memory systems should improve these areas. It would also seem to take greater time 
and effort to build such systems with larger membership. Finally, task credibility (i.e. 
recognizing expertise and not challenging others) may be harder to obtain with larger 
teams. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
Hypothesis 2: In teams of greater than three individuals, transactive memory will affect 
performance in a positive manner. 
31 
Do transactive memory systems operate outside the laboratory, for instance in the 
field or in simulations? It would seem that they do. Wegner's (1987, 1991) natural 
couples developed their transactive memory system outside of the laboratory and it was 
simply tested inside the lab. However, Moreland et al.'s (1998) radio groups were all 
undergraduates and the groups were nominal. Tests of actual teams in the field are 
needed. 
Hypothesis 3: Transactive memory effects found in laboratory groups, will be present 
outside the laboratory. 
A number of variables should influence the development of transactive memory 
in the team (see Figure 1). Will consistent turnover or the reconstituting of teams cripple 
transactive memory and in tum lower performance? It seems likely, especially if 
transactive memory systems take time to develop as Wegner ( 1987) hypothesized. 
Moreland et al. ( 1996) demonstrated that teams that experienced turnover after training 
did not perform as well as teams that were trained and tested together. It also is 
conceivable that time in an organization may be related to the development of transactive 
memory. The longer an individual has been in an organization, the greater the 
opportunities to know other's strengths and weaknesses. This greater knowledge of 
other organizational members should translate into higher transactive memory levels 
among the teams, even if these teams are consistently reconstituted. 
Hypothesis 4: Turnover, via the reconstitution of teams, will negatively affect 
transactive memory and performance in tum. 
Hypothesis 5: Teams trained together will foster development of transactive memory 
systems which will result in increased performance over others trained in separate teams. 
Hypothesis 6: Interaction over time in an organization should increase the level of 
transactive memory among teams. 
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Finally, collective efficacy has been shown to be a predictor of piloting 
performance in the laboratory (Lindsley et al. 1994). By extension it seems that 
collective efficacy should also predict flight performance in the air (see Fig. 1). Mischel 
and Northcraft (1997) have hypothesized that a portion of an individual's collective 
efficacy estimate is a determination of the KSAs of the group members in both task 
knowledge and interpersonal group skills. This is related to the idea of transactive 
memory (who knows what, who does what, who is good at what). However, as seen 
earlier, transactive memory consists of more than knowledge of interpersonal and task 
skills. As pictured in Figure 1, transactive memory and collective efficacy are both 
hypothesized to influence performance. Based on the previous discussion, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 7: Collective efficacy will be a predictor of flight crew performance. 
Hypothesis 8: Transactive memory will explain variance in flight crew performance, 
above and beyond that of collective efficacy. 
Chapter 4 




Study 1 was a flight simulation using a pilot and advisor team. The pilot flew a 
PC based simulator mission with the aid of the advisor in an effort to engage and destroy 
enemy aircraft. Transactive memory was examined through an experimental design that 
manipulated the composition of the pilot/advisor teams. More specifically, in one 
condition the pilots had the same advisor during their second set of trials while in the 
other condition the advisor for the second set of trials was new. This study tests 
Hypothesis 1, that teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform teams 
with lower levels of transactive memory. 
Subjects 
Subjects for this study were eight current or former military fighter pilots or 
Weapons Systems Operators from the local area. Each subject had been a rated military 
fighter aviator with at least 1,250 hours of military jet fighter time. An earlier pilot study 
indicated that actual military pilots \Vere required to realistically complete the task. Due 
to the rigorous participation criteria. only eight aviators could be recruited. Subjects 
participated on a volunteer basis and all were males. Irt all, the subjects possessed over 
18,550 hours in fighter aircraft. Seven of the eight had actual combat time in either 
Vietnam or the Persian Gulf. Table 1 summarizes the subjects' experience in particular 
aircraft. Each box indicates a type of aircraft, the number of individuals who flew that 
aircraft and the total hours in that aircraft. Several subjects had time in multiple aircraft, 
so the total does not sum to eight. The subject pool was very impressive· and provides 
excellent external validity. 
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T bl 1 S b" a e . u 11ect s expenence m vanous fi h afi 1g ter airer t. 
F-4 F-15 F-5 
3@ 3875 3@ 2810 1 @200 
A-4 F-14 F-18 
2@ 1325 2@ 2300 1@ 1000 
F-105 F-111 A-10 
1 @750 1@ 1300 1 @ 1400 
(number of subjects @ total hours) 
Design 
This study was a 2X2X2 mixed factor design. The first factor was Advisor 
(Same/ Different) which was a between subject factor. The second factor was Week 
(One/ Two) which was a within subject factor. The third factor was Technical (Tech) 
Condition (High/ Low), also a within subject factor. The Tech condition was created for 
an alternative research project. Under the Tech condition, the advisor's access to the 
pilot was manipulated. In the High Tech condition, the advisor was seated next to the 
pilot with visual access to the pilot and the pilot's displays. In the Low Tech condition, a 
curtain separated the advisor and the pilot, restricting visual access between the two. 
The primary factor of interest for this study was Advisor (Same/ Different) 
during Week 2. It is in this condition that transactive memory was manipulated. During 
Week 2 the pilot either worked with the same advisor he had trained with during Week 1 
(transactive memory condition) or a different advisor (no transactive memory condition). 
Therefore, only the results of the Week 2 Advisor manipulation will be reported with one 
exception. When there was a significant interaction with one of the other factors, then 
that interaction will be reported. 
Pilots flew an F-22 PC based simulator on a simulated combat mission. They 
were assisted by one of two advisors who helped them navigate, evade enemy threats, 
and engage and destroy hostile aircraft. Pilots were trained by the advisor during the first 
week and then performed two actual trials. One of the trials was in the High Tech 
condition where the advisor had greater visual access to the pilot and the pilot's 
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information and view. The other trial was in the Low Tech condition where the 
advisor's view of the pilot was restricted, as was information about the pilot's situation. 
The pilots returned one week later. They worked with either the Same Advisor as Week 
1 or a Different Advisor. They received a short refresher session on the simulation and 
then performed two criteria trials, High and Low Tech. Tech condition was 
counterbalanced. 
Procedure and Task 
Advisors were trained over several weeks on the characteristics of the PC based 
simulator, the simulation, and the specific mission to be accomplished. Training ensured 
that both advisors were equal in ability. 
When pilots arrived they were greeted by the experimenter. They received a 
short introduction to the task and then were introduced to the advisor. The advisor then 
took them to the simulator and conducted a training session with the pilot using a three 
page checklist (see Appendix A). The training session covered the mechanics of the 
control inputs, the symbology of the simulator displays, and the handling characteristics 
of the simulator. The pilot was then instructed on weapons use, evading threats, 
employing wingmen, and finding targets. The training session concluded with a criterion 
trial. In the criterion trial the pilot had to successfully down three enemy aircraft without 
being shot-down. Once criterion was reached, the actual trials began. Introduction, 
training, and criterion trials required approximately 45 to 50 minutes to complete. 
The actual mission consisted of a simulated Combat Air Patrol (CAP) mission 
over Bosnia. These were routine missions where friendly fighter aircraft orbit and wait 
for enemy aircraft to come across a designated line. Once enemy aircraft were detected 
they were to be engaged and destroyed. The simulation began with the pilot in the air 
over Italy. The simulation was then "fast forwarded" as the pilot was taken across the 
Adriatic Sea to Bosnia. Just before leaving the Adriatic Sea airspace, the simulator was 
frozen and the actual trial began. The advisor aided the pilot in navigating the aircraft, 
identify enemy targets, engaging the enemy, avoiding air to air and ground threats, and 
employing weapons. The advisor's role was a cross between the role of an onboard 
Weapons System Operator in older fighter aircraft and an Airborne Warning and 
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Command System (AWACS) advisor who is responsible for directing friendly air forces 
in a coordinated manner against threats. The Air Force is currently investigating ways to 
make the AW ACS advisor more helpful and this study was conducted in conjunction 
with that investigation. 
The pilot and advisor had access to similar information, however, only the 
advisor could view situations more than 25 miles from the pilot's aircraft. In the High 
Tech condition the advisor had a much better idea of what was actually occurring in the 
"cockpit" of the pilot. 
Every three minutes an alarm sounded and the simulator was frozen. Displays 
were then covered and both pilot and advisor filled out questionnaires on situational 
awareness measures (see Appendix B) and their perception of the value of 
communication between themselves (Appendix C). The advisor, using information from 
the displays, immediately graded only answers to the situational awareness questions. 
Once those questions had been graded, the simulation was continued. Pilots were not 
advised of their performance on the situational awareness measures. Questionnaires 
were completed four times for both the High and Low Tech trials. The actual mission 
portion lasted for 12 minutes for both the High and Low Tech conditions unless the 
aircraft was shot down or crashed (at which time that trial terminated). At the end of the 
trial, several performance measures were recorded by the advisor on the front of the 
Situational Awareness questionnaires (see Appendix D). Sessions were videotaped for 
later analysis of behavioral transactive memory indices (see Appendix E). 
The Week 2 trials were identical to Week 1 with few exceptions. The advisor 
either remained the same as the first week (Same) or was replaced by the second advisor 
(Different). Instead of an extensive training period, pilots were given a quick (10 
minute) review session of the symbology, switchology, control inputs, utilization of 
wingmen, and_ a short practice dogfight. Performance measures, situational awareness 
measures, and videotape all remained the same. 
Measures 
Performance. The simulation computed several performance measures for each 
mission and printed it out following the mission. The result was a categorical summary 
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(five categories from Poor to Outstanding) computed by the simulator using the other 
performance measures. Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) was a measure of weapon 
employment (100% reflects total accuracy with all weapons). Effectiveness considered 
targets destroyed as well as friendly losses (0-100%). Mission duration was calculated 
from the time the simulator came off of freeze, until the final Situational Awareness 
buzzer sounded (a maximum of 12 minutes). Number of aircraft shotdown was self-
explanatory. How Ended was a dichotomous variable, either flew away (2) or shot 
down/crashed (1). 
Situational Awareness. Situational awareness (SA) of both the pilot and advisor 
was measured using the form shown in Appendix B. This form was based on the 
SAGAT (Situational Awareness Global Assessment Technique) used to assess military 
pilot's SA (Endsley, 1995). The items addressed location of wingmen, location of 
bogeys (i.e. enemy aircraft), aircraft information (e.g. aircraft attitude), and number, type, 
and result of weapons fired. All this information is important to combat success. 
Situational Awareness was a percentage score. A score of 1.0 indicated completely 
accurate SA answers. 
Perception of Communication. The value of communication between pilot and 
advisor was assessed on this questionnaire (see Appendix C) deveioped at the Human 
Interface Technology (HIT) Laboratory at the University of Washington with the help of 
the Investigator. 
Behavioral Analysis. Videotapes were made of both Week 1 and Week 2 
sessions. A trained observer from the Speech Communications Department, who was 
blind to the experiment, later analyzed the videotapes for the three behavioral indices of 
transactive memory (memory differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility). 
Additionally, the Investigator also analyzed the tapes using the same rating forms (see 
Appendix E). Ratings between observers were compared and revealed a high correlation 
(r = .972). Therefore, both observer's ratings were combined for statistical analyses. 
Only ratings of Week 2 were used in the analyses. Videotape rating training to ensure 
consistency between raters, was conducted with Week 1 tapes. Week 2 tapes were the 
actual tapes coded for transactive memory. 
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The rating form (see Appendix E) was an expanded version of the form used by 
Liang et al. ( 1995) in their behavioral coding. The rating form consisted of nine scales 
designed to evaluate the three components of Transactive Memory as defined by 
Moreland and colleagues (1998). Eight of the scales were 7 point lickert scales with a 
neutral middle position. The final measure was a behavioral count of incidences of 
confusion between the pilot and the advisor. The three components of TM and the 
measures are listed in Figure 2. 
Memory Differentiation 
Remember Different Elements 
Responsibility for Different tasks 
. Task Coordination 
Task Coordination 
Confusion (count) 
Smoothness of Commun. 
Level of Cooperation 
Task Credibility 
Level of Criticism 
Level of Frustration 
Accept Suggestions 
Figure 2. Chart of Behavioral Analysis Items for Transactive Memory Videotape Rating 
Form. 
Results 
Determination of Significance. The individual sample size (n=8) of Study 1 was 
small. Furthermore, when dealing with group level phenomenon it is difficult to reach 
the "classic" alpha significance level of .05. With these considerations in mind, an alpha 
significance level of .10 was chosen as a reasonable level (Cascio & Zedeck, 1983). All 
p values reported will be one-tailed unless noted otherwise. 
Descriptive Statistics. A visual inspection of the data was conducted. Two of the 
performance dependent measures (Result and BDA) resulted in very high performance 
with little variance. This is likely due to the high abilities of the subjects. No other 
departures from normality were noted. 
Equivalence of Advisors. Advisors worked closely together during training in 
order to ensure equivalent ability and techniques. Analyses of the first week's 
performance data indicated no difference between advisors' performance with pilots. 
Hypothesis l. Hypothesis 1 asserts that higher performance will be attained by 
pilots in the transactive memory condition (same advisor both weeks). Study 1 
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endeavored to measure performance through a variety of means; each of these measures 
will be covered in tum. 
Pilot Performance. It was hypothesized that pilots working with the same advisor 
in both Weeks 1 and 2 (Same Ad, T.M. condition) would show higher performance than 
those changing advisors on Week 2 (Different Ad, no T.M. condition). Only Week 2 is 
of interest for this transactive memory analysis as that is where the advisor change 
occurred (see Table 2). A MANOV A was performed on five of the dependent variables 
(the dichotomous variable was excluded to satisfy MANOVA requirements). The 
MANOV A for the performance data indicates that the advisor condition does not 
significantly effect the performance of the pilot in the second week (Wilks' lamba p = 
.289). The two groups do not differ across the vector of DV s. 
Table 2. Performance Data b Transactive memo Condition 
Same Advisor (T.M.) Different Advisor (no T.M.) 
Duration of Fli ht 11.00 · 9.64 
# Aircraft shot down 2.75 3.38 
Bomb Dama e Assess. 90.36 83.93 
Mission Effectiveness 90.00 85.88 
Downed 1 or Flew Awa 2 1.75 1.62 
4.88 4.13 
The majority of the dependent measures were in the hypothesized direction (five· 
of the six). However, none of the dependent measures reached statistical significance. 
This is likely attributable to the small sample size (n = 8). 
Situational Awareness. The transactive memory analyses revealed that when the 
advisor was changed for Week 2, that situational awareness on the part of the pilot was 
decreased (see Table 3). This is likely due to the fact that the advisor was not familiar 
with what type of information that the particular pilot required to build high SA. The 
Same Advisor pilots had higher SA than the Different Advisor pilots (p = .028). 
Furthermore. the Same Advisor Condition in period 3 also resulted in higher SA (p = 
.037), however. measures from this period should be taken with caution. Debriefs with 
the pilots after the simulator mission -revealed that they were periodically taken into 
-----------------------------------------·-----~-------
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scenarios under which they would not have entered under actual combat conditions. 
These "furballs" often occurred when several enemy aircraft engaged the pilot while he 
was near a surface to air missile (SAM) site. The pilots reported that they normally 
would have egressed (exited) the situation, but were not given this option in our 
simulation. These scenarios ( or "furballs") occurred only during periods 2 and 3 when 
the fighting was at its most intense. Furthermore, the values for periods 3 and 4 suffer 
from a smaller sample size as there are no values for pilots shot down in previous 
periods. 
Table 3. Situational Awareness b Transactive memo Condition for Pilots 
Same Advisor Different Advisor 
Overall SA .75** .62** 
SA .74 .73 
SA .62 .40 
SA .85** .61** 
.81 .60 
**p < .05 
The situational awareness of the advisor was also examined. Just as from the 
Pilot's perspective, we see that a change· in advisor - pilot pairings also adversely 
affected the advisor's SA (see Table 4). When the advisor- pilot paring was changed, 
the advisor's SA decreased (p = .039). There are similar results for periods 2 (p = .096) 
and period 4 (p = .073). It is suspected that the pairs were not as cognizant of the 
information that the other member required to build high levels of SA. 
Table 4. Situational Awareness b Transactive memo Condition for Advisors 






**p < .05; *p < .10 
...----------------------------------~----------
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Perceptual Data. Reliabilities for the perceptual scales were assessed. For the 
pilots' ratings a= .76, and for the advisors' ratings a= .89. The perceptual (or 
subjective) ratings made by both the pilot and advisor at the end of each flying period 
revealed few significant differences. A MANOV A was performed on the seven 
dependent variables for the pilot's ratings. The MANOVA for the perceptual data 
indicates that the advisor condition (same of different) does not significantly effect the 
perceptual ratings of the pilot in the second week (Wilks' lamba p = .935). The two 
groups do not differ across the vector of DVs. However when the ratings are examined 
individually there are indications that there may be some underlying differences. From 
the pilot's perspective, when the advisor changed, all subjective ratings dropped or 
stayed the same. Only the pilot's rating of the advisor's performance approached 
significance (p = .116). When the advisor changed, the pilot tended to rate the advisor's 
performance lower. 
Things were a bit stronger from the advisor's perspective (see Table 5). All 
ratings made by the advisor were lower when the advisor was working with a new pilot 
(Different Ad) in Week 2. The advisor rated his own performance lower when working 
with a new pilot (p=.053) and the advisor rated the new pilot's performance lower as 
well (p= .092). Interestingly, the advisor's confidence in the correctness of his ratings of 
the pilot's SA drops when working with a new pilot (p= .074) 
a e T bl 5 f . Perceptual Data rom the Advisor's perspective 
Measure Same Advisor Different Advisor 
(T.M.) (no T.M.) 
Amt of Communication .75 .72 
Value of Communication .81 .80 
Instigator of .86 .85 
Communication 
Advisor's Performance *.87 * .81 
Pilot's Performance *.89 *.82 
Other's SA .85 .79 
Confidence in Ratin2 *.81 *.65 
*p < .10 
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Behavioral Analysis. Reliabilities for the sub-scales were assessed. For the 
Memory Differentiation items a= .11, for the Task Coordination items a= .63, and for 
the Task Credibility items a = .51 . The Memory Differentiation component is 
particularly low. This may be due to hierarchical roles as discussed later. The Memory 
Differentiation Component of transactive memory revealed no significant differences. 
This was surprising as the series of studies by Moreland and colleagues (1998) 
consistently showed a difference between teams that stayed together versus teams that 
were reconstituted. 
Analyses of the Task Coordination Component of transactive memory revealed 
some surprising trends. Generally, the Different Advisor Condition resulted in smoother 
task coordination, less confusion, and more effective sequencing of communication. In a 
nutshell, it seems that the Different Advisor Condition resulted· in better communication 
between pilot and advisor. 
Specifics of the Task Coordination Component are below (see Table 6). There 
was a significant interaction between Tech and Advisor in relationship to Confusion. 
This interaction is seen in Figure 3. High Tech seems to mitigate increased confusion in 
the Different Advisor condition, but not in the Same Advisor Condition. Perhaps there 
is an increased vigilance when working in the Different Advisor condition which would 
explain this interaction (see Fig. 3). Interaction aside, Same Advisor showed 
significantly more incidences of confusion than did the Different Advisor Condition. 
Different Advisor also showed higher task coordination and smoother sequencing of 
communication. 
Table 6. Task Coordination Com onent b Transactive memo Condition 
Same Advisor Different Advisor 
Amt of Confusion 4.50*** 1.50*** 
------! 
Task Coordination 6.25* 6.69* 
------f 
Se uence Communication 5.56*** 6.31 *** 
__ ...._ _________ -+-----------+-----












- .... -- .... -- .... _ - .... _____ _ 
- .... - - .... -








Figure 3. Interaction of Tech and Advisor Condition for the Confusion Variable 
There were no specific trends noted in the Task Credibility Component of 
transactive memory. It is likely that the computer simulation of combat was unable to 
induce any differences in Frustration, Criticism, or Accepting Suggestions that could 
result in an actual flight under hostile flying conditions. 
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In summary of the Behavioral Analysis. the assignment of roles may affect the 
Memory Differentiation Component of transactive memory. The increased arousal of 
working with a new Advisor/Pilot may have led to increased emphasis on 
communication between the two. This communication was not able to overcome the 
advantages of working in the same teams that was evident under the Performance and 
Situational Awareness measures. Finally, it is unlikely that a simulation can induce 
increased levels of criticism, frustration, and resistance to suggestions (especially with 
clearly delineated roles) due to the more powerful effects of such things as Social 
Desirability (e.g. pilot and advisor maintaining a cordial relationship). 
Taken as a whole these results provide only partial support for Hypotheses 1. 
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Discussion of Study 1 
It seems that when Advisor/ Pilot teams are kept in tact (the transactive memory 
condition), performance measures have a tendency to be higher. Larger sample sizes are 
required to confirm this trend. Both pilots and advisors showed higher SA when they 
remained in their set team. Interestingly, when the Advisor / Pilot team is changed, the 
advisor rates both the pilot's and the advisor's (his own) performance as lower. Perhaps 
this is a reflection of a perceived increase in difficulty in working with a new pilot on the 
part of the advisor. Finally, video behavioral analyses indicate that memory 
differentiation and responsibility may become overlapped in a situation where team 
members are assigned roles that encompass a teacher/pupil relationship. It also seems 
that new teams put more effort into smoothly communicating and coordinating with one 
another in an effort to effectively work with the new team member. 
Surprisingly, the Memory Differentiation component of transactive memory 
revealed no significant differences in this study. One explanation for the lack of 
significance is the fact that team members were assigned clear roles in this study. In 
Moreland's studies team members were never assigned roles, rather roles emerged as 
persons with specialized knowledge migrated towards certain positions. Furthermore, in 
this study there was almost a hierarchical relationship between the two positions. The 
advisor not only assisted the pilot, but also trained the pilot in the use of the simulator 
(e.g. use of controls, symbology, etc.). These roles may have dictated that both pilot and 
advisor would maintain similar types of information. It also may have led to an overlap 
in responsibility for the tasks dictated by the scenario. This idea that assigned roles may 
be a boundary condition for the Memory Differentiation Component requires further 
research. 
The Different Advisor Condition (the no transactive memory condition) produced 
significantly higher results for the Task Coordination Component of Transactive 
memory. These results were not expected, rather the Same Advisor Condition was 
hypothesized to result in better task coordination. It seems likely that a change in 
advisors resulted in greater arousal on the part of the pilot and the advisor. When the 
advisor changed it may have caused both the pilot and the advisor to put more effort into 
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their communication since they were unfamiliar with one another. Conversely, perhaps 
the same advisor and pilot teams took more of a "laissez faire" attitude ("ok, same ole, 
same ole, same mission, same advisor") as little had changed from the first week's 
mission. In the Same Advisor condition, advisors and pilots were familiar with one 
another and perhaps not as vigilant in their communication patterns. This would explain 
less effective levels of communication, but yet an increase in performance and SA 
measures. 
The greatest strength and weakness of this study are both related to the sample. 
The sample size was extremely small. This made it difficult to find any significant 
differences in the results. However, there were some significant differences in 
performance indicating the robust value of transactive memory in teams. Taken as a 
whole, several trends were clear even with the small sample size. 
The reason for the small sample size was the extremely high criteria for 
participation in the study. The vast majority of studies to date have used college students 
as subjects. The use of combat jet pilots increases the generalizability of these findings 
outside of the lab into the cockpit. Subjects were professional and expert in the flying 
task. Earlier pilot studies of this research indicated that novices were not able to 
accomplish the task of combating enemy aircraft due to their inability to fly the 
simulator, operate the weaponry, and performing the combat maneuvers required to 
defeat the enemy. Anecdotally, several of the participants commented on the high 
fidelity and realism of the simulator. 
Study l was one of the most realistic lab tests of transactive memory to date. 
However, field testing is required in transactive memory research. No field tests of 
transactive memory have appeared in the literature. Furthermore, Wegner et al. (1991) 
employed natural teams in their sample and Hollingshead ( 1998) recently surveyed 
employees at the University of Illinois on their natural office staff teams. However, in 
the lab portion of her study, Hollingshead used nominal teams. In short, there have been 
few tests of transactive memory using natural teams and no tests in field settings. Study 
2 and 3 provide field tests of transactive memory and collective efficacy on actual Air 
Force aircrews in the KC-135. These are important tests examining the question: is 
transactive memory a construct strictly for the lab, or is it important in the real world? 
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Chapter 5 
Study 2: Fairchild AFB 
Methods 
Overview 
Study 2 was a field study using Air Force flight teams at Fairchild AFB. Crew 
levels of transactive memory and collective efficacy were collected prior to an 
operational aircraft check flight. The flight was graded by independent evaluators to 
provide performance measures. 
Subjects and Setting 
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Subjects were actual Air Force KC-135 aircrews stationed at Fairchild AFB in 
Spokane, Washington. Fairchild is the largest KC-135 base in the world. The Boeing 
KC-135 Stratotanker is used for aerial refueling and to transport cargo. The aircraft is . 
based on the Boeing 707 airframe. There are four crewmembers on board the aircraft. 
The Aircraft Commander (AC) is the senior pilot on board and is the final authority for 
aircrew decisions. The AC generally has at least three years of experience in the aircraft 
and has flown for a minimum of four years. The Copilot (Co) is the second pilot on 
board. The Copilot assists the AC in piloting the aircraft. He or she has access to 
identical controls and nearly all the same switches and instruments available to the AC. 
The experience range of a Copilot varies between several months to three years. The 
Navigator (Nav) is seated behind the pilots and is responsible for navigating the aircraft 
using both electronic and celestial equipment. The navigator also assumes some 
communication duties and generally is responsible for any classified material aboard the 
aircraft. The experience range of a navigator can vary from a couple of months to over 
ten years. The KC-135 is beginning to undergo modifications in order to replace the 
Navigator with updated electronic equipment to be managed by the pilots. 
The Boom Operator (Boom) is the only non-commissioned officer aboard the 
aircraft. The Boom is responsible for operating the boom apparatus in order to refuel 
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other aircraft from the KC-135. The Boom is also responsible for handling the cargo and 
dealing with any passengers on board. Boom Operators vary in experience from several 
months to over twenty years. In summary, the KC-135 aircrew is composed of an 
Aircraft Commander, Copilot, Navigator, and Boom. Operator. 
A total of 87 crewmembers participated. However, 12 of those individuals were 
involved with flights with no checkrides (and thus no performance scores) and were 
therefore dropped from the sample. Another two individuals responded to the survey, 
but the other two crewmembers on board did not and therefore, the crew surveys were 
unusable. This resulted in a sample of 73 ( of a possible 7 6) individuals and a total of 19 
aircrews. Of the three missing surveys, one individual failed to respond to the survey. 
One individual (from a Day 1 flight; crew surveyed on Day 2, see below) was dispatched 
from the base before they could be surveyed and one individual was assigned to the 
evaluation team, but acting as a crewmember on a flight, and therefore was asked not to 
fill out a survey. Twenty crews were evaluated during the inspection. Usable surveys 
were returned by nineteen of the crews for a response rate of 95%. Subjects served on a 
volunteer basis. There were 66 males and 7 females. Experience in the KC-135 ranged 
from several months to over 20 years. 
Procedure and Task 
Air Force crews are subject to a major inspection (known as ASEV, or Aircrew 
Standardization Evaluation Visit) once every two years. During this visit, 25% of the 
crews on base are planned to be evaluated by Headquarters personnel for flying 
efficiency and effectiveness during an operational checkride flight. A checkride is a 
flight where one or more of the crewmembers is evaluated by an experienced check 
crewmember in order to determine the readiness and proficiency of the evaluatee and 
crew. 
During mission planning the day prior, or the morning of the checkride, the 
experimenter administered crews a questionnaire to assess transactive memory and 
collective efficacy. (see Appendix F). Each crew received a survey for each of the four 
crewmembers. Prior to the flight, the crews dropped completed surveys into a 
designated box in the mission planning room of Base Operations. At the end of the day 
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the experimenter retrieved the surveys which were sealed in an envelope. Two of the 
crews, which were evaluated during day one of the evaluation, received their surveys 
after the flight. It was not possible to administer their surveys prior to the flight. 
After the checkride was complete, the evaluator completed a questionnaire 
concerning the aircrew's performance on the checkride. This questionnaire focused on 
overall aircrew performance (see Appendix G). Both questionnaires were accompanied 
by a cover letter (see Appendix H). 
Measures 
Collective Efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured using questions 44, 47, 
49, and 50 of the aircrew questionnaire (see Appendix F). Question 44 was adapted 
from Peterson et al.' s ( 1996) measure of team efficacy. Following the suggestion of 
Mischel and Northcraft (1997), the efficacy questions refer to both task skills and 
knowledge. Items 47 and 49 were used by Lindsley et al. (1994) in their study of 
collective efficacy in flight simulation tasks. They point out that using confidence 
measures at different levels of performance has been shown to· show greater variation 
than use of yes/no questions for each performance level (c.f. Gist and Mitchell, 1992). 
Therefore, confidence at each level was used for items 47 and 49. Item 50, the final 
collective efficacy item, was a measure developed by the author. There is a 
corresponding item in the Evaluator's questionnaire (see Appendix G). The collective 
efficacy measure was calculated by averaging across the four items. Since the items 
employed different scales, item scores were converted to standardized z-scores. The z-
scores were then averaged for the four items across individuals and then teams to arrive 
at the collective efficacy score for each crew. 
Transactive memory. Following the recommendation of Moreland et al. ( 1998), 
transactive memory was evaluated through three direct indices: the agreement within a 
group about who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what; the accuracy of 
those beliefs. and the complexity ( or strength) of those beliefs. 
Agreement 
Crew responsibilities (items 11-18 of Appendix F) were developed by the author 
in coordination with experienced KC-135 crewmembers. These items are flight tasks 
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with ill-defined responsibilities. In other words, there is no standard procedure for who 
must accomplish these tasks. Therefore, they give a good indication of how well the 
crew knows "who does what". Each item was scored by comparing answers across the 
four crewmembers. If all four crewmembers agreed on that answer, the score was 100% 
for that item. If only two members agreed the score was 50% and so on. If all four of 
the crewmembers disagreed, the score was 0% for that item. The scores were then 
averaged across the items. Similarly, the Crew Skills section (items 19-22) gives a good 
indication of "who is good at what" and "who knows what". Level of agreement was 
calculated as was done for the Crew Responsibilities section. Finally, items 26-29 of the 
Crew Strengths section indicate "who is good at what". Level of agreement was 
calculated as before. The final level of agreement score was derived by using a weighted 
mean of all three agreement sections. 
Accuracy 
Accuracy of beliefs was measured using the Crew Strengths section (items 26-29 
of Appendix F). Crew members were asked to rate each other's greatest strength in a 
forced choice method from among three major flight areas: crew coordination, technical 
proficiency, and systems/ emergency knowledge options. Each crewmember also rated 
their own greatest strength (item 29, Appendix F) and the evaluator rated the 
crewmember's greatest strength (item 5 Individual Evaluation, Appendix G). An 
accuracy score was determined using both the self-reported strength and the evaluator 
rated strength. For example, the copilot self reports that crew coordination is his greatest 
strength. Two of the other three crewmembers also report that crew coordination is the 
copilot's greatest strength. The self-report accuracy is then 67%. Meanwhile the 
evaluator rates technical proficiency as the copilot's greatest strength as does one of the 
three crewmembers. The evaluator accuracy rating is then 33%. The overall accuracy 
score for the copilot is then the average of the two, in this case 50%. The accuracy rating 
would be determined in like manner for the other three crewmembers. The accuracy 
scores for the four crewmembers would then be averaged to produce one accuracy score 




Moreland et al. (1998) suggested using complexity of group members' beliefs 
about one another's skills as a direct measure of knowledge in transactive memory. 
Their measure of complexity consisted in how well subjects could describe each other's 
strengths and weaknesses in knowledge and technical proficiency. A more direct 
approach to this issue is a self-report measure. The Crew Strengths section (items 23-25 
of Appendix F) assessed strength of belief level for each crewmember. A five-point 
scale was used from: 1-"very limited knowledge" to 5- "as well as you can know them" .. 
Strength of beliefs was simply the mean of each crewmember' s ratings. Crews with high 
transactive memory should report higher knowledge of crew strengths. 
The overall transactive memory score was a mean of the agreement, accuracy, 
and strength scores. Analyses were also conducted using each of the three components 
to investigate which component seemed to be the most important. 
Crew Hardness. A measure of "crew hardness" was used to measure a construct 
that captures how often crewmembers fly as an integral crew. Crew hardness was 
determined on a percentage basis over the 90-day period prior to the evaluation. Crew 
hardness was determined by dividing the number of times individual crewmembers flew 
together over the total number of times flown over a three month period. These figures 
were obtained from the Flight Records Division of the flying unit. For example, during 
the ASEV checkride the AC flew with Co B, Nav C, and Boom D. In the previous 90 
days the AC once flew with just Co B (.50), once with Co Band Nav C (.75), and once 
with B, C, and D (1.0). The AC also flew with other crewmembers on one flight (.25) . 
. The AC' s overall hardness figure would be .50. Meanwhile the Copilot had five flights 
and his hardness score was .40 and the Nav had 3 flights and a hardness score of .60. 
Finally the Boom had 6 flights and a hardness score of .70. The crew hardness score 
would be 
[(.50) + (.40) + (.60) + (.70)] I 4 = .55 
Crew hardness was also calculated by weighting the individual hardness score by 
the number of flights over the last 90 days. Using the numbers above the crew hardness 
score would be as follows: 
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[4(.50) + 5(.40) + 3(.60) + 6(.70)] / 4 = .56 
Similar results were obtained using both procedures. In addition, number of 
flights over the last 90 days was a separate control variable. For these reasons it was 
determined to use only the first method of crew hardness calculation. 
As mentioned previously, two crews completed their surveys after their checkride 
flight. The crew hardness scores for the~e two crews were adjusted to include the 
checkride flight in the crew hardness scores. The other evaluated crews' hardness score 
did not include the checkride flight, but only flights in the previous 90 days. Analyses 
revealed that adjusting the crew hardness scores in this manner did not alter overall 
results. 
Control Variables. A number of control variables were included to account for 
individual differences in ability and experience. The first control variable was total 
flight hours, which is an indication of experience and, to a lesser extent, ability. Total 
flight hours was a self-report measure and the flight hours were summed for the entire 
crew. 
Instructor status was also a control variable. After a period of roughly three years 
a person is selected for instructor school after demonstrating sound ability in their 
position. Instructors receive special training on the aircraft and aircraft procedures and 
in tum train younger crewmembers. Thus, Instructor status reflects both experience and 
ability and the number of instructors aboard the aircraft was calculated for each crew. 
Instructor status was determined via the Flight Records Section of the flying unit. 
Duration of mission qualification, is the time that a crewmember has been 
mission qualified (i.e. declared competent) in that crew position. This figure can range 
from several months to over twenty years. This figure was obtained from Flights 
Records and totaled for each crew providing another indication of crew experience. 
Distinguished graduate status indicates those crewmembers who were 
distinguished graduates in a flying or mission related training program. This is a 
measure of ability and a self-report item. This variable was dummy coded for the crew, 
with a 1 indicating that one or more crewmembers were distinguished graduates. 
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Flights in last 90 days was the last control variable used. Number of flights in the 
last ninety days is a common check the Air Force conducts to determine the "currency" 
of air crewmembers. Currency helps to ensure that crewmembers remain proficient in 
the aircraft. It is assumed that the more flights a crewmember has, the more proficient 
they will become (up to a point). There are a minimum and maximum number of flights 
allowed every ninety days. Number of flights can also be a proxy for experience or 
ability. The instructors in a flying unit (those more experienced and with higher ability) 
generally have additional duties which preclude them from flying a great deal. In other 
words, the younger crewmembers do most of the flying, while the experienced 
crewmembers supervise, administrate, and fly a little bit as well. In addition to flying 
less, the instructors also tend to fly with a variety of different crewmembers when they 
do fly. The number of flights in the last 90 days was obtained from the Flight Records 
Division of the flying unit. 
Criterion Variables. There were two criterion variables in this study. The first 
was Critiques per Crew. For each checkride, individuals were rated on multiple items 
(e.g. mission planning; weather avoidance, takeoff, situational awareness, etc.). On each 
item an individual can receive a critique for not accomplishing the item in an error free 
or proper manner. The Crew Critiques per Crew score was determined by adding up the 
total number of critiques that were related to crew effectiveness. For example, if the 
copilot received a critique for landings this would not be related to crew effectiveness. 
· A poor landing is an individual deficiency. However, a critique for forgetting to lower 
the gear on final approach would be a crew deficiency. The crewmember flying the 
aircraft is primarily responsible for having the gear lowered, however each crewmember 
is responsible for ensuring the gear is lowered on final approach to landing. 
Evaluators annotate the number of critiques onto a standard Air Force checkride 
form. Evaluators were asked to transfer the number of critiques related to crew 
coordination onto the Evaluator's survey (see Appendix G). 
The number of crew critiques for each individual crewmember was totaled and 
divided by the number of crewmembers checked, to arrive at the Critiques per Crew 





scored so that a higher total indicates a better Critique score for the crew. This could be 
considered the more objective of the two criterion variables since it was tied to specific 
performance parameters. 
The second Criterion variable was Overall Crew Evaluation (item 3 of Appendix 
G). Each evaluator on the flight was asked to rate the overall crew performance. A 
mean score was taken from the individual evaluator ratings. This measure could be 
considered the more subjective of the two criterion variables. 
Results 
Determination of Significance. The individual sample size (n=76) of study 2 was 
favorable. However, because there were four members per crew, Study 2 had a lower 
crew sample size (n=19) than desired, despite enjoying an extremely high response rate 
(95% ). Furthermore, when dealing with group level phenomenon, it is difficuH to reach 
the "classic" alpha significance level of .05. Additionally, this was the first field study of 
its kind and therefore was somewhat exploratory in nature. With these considerations in 
mind. an alpha significance level of .10 was chosen and will be used for this study 
(Cascio & Zedeck, 1983). All p values reported will be one-tailed unless noted 
otherwise. 
Descriptive Statistics. The variables of interest in this study were either 
measured at the crew level or measured at the individual level and then aggregated to the 
crew level. Therefore, checks for normality and other descriptive statistics were 
performed on the crew level variables. A visual inspection of the data revealed no 
serious departures from normality. 
Control Variables. When it is stated that experience and ability were controlled, 
the five control variables listed in Table 7 are the reference. Table 7 depicts the 
correlations between the control variables and performance. 
T bl 7 C 1 . a e orre atlons b d I'D . bl etween contro an pe ormance vana es 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Total Hours .16 .32* 
Mission Qualified Duration .17 .18 
Distinguished Graduate -.20 -.07 
(Dummy Variable) 
Instructors Onboard .32* .34* 
Flights -.18 -.58** 
(Last 90 days) 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
*p < .10, ** p < .05 
Somewhat surprisingly, the distinguished graduate correlation was a negative 
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one. However, the correlation was quite low and does not approach significance. Of 
greater concern, is the negative relationship between flights in the last ninety days and 
performance. Recall from the earlier discussion of control variables that number of 
flights can also be a proxy for experience or ability. Instructors (those more experienced 
and with higher ability) generally have additional duties which preclude them from 
flying a great deal. It is clear from Table 7 that a greater number of instructors on board 
were highly positively related to Overall Crew evaluation. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the number of flights - performance relationship was a negative one. Stated another 
way, having lots of flights in the last ninety days was an indication of less experience and 
ability. Support for this claim can be seen in Table 8. 
T bl 8 C I . a e orre ations b etween ff h 1g ts an d . d' experience m 1cators 
Flights (Last 90 days) 
Total Hours -.34* 
Mission Qualified Duration -.35* 
Instructors Onboard -.39* 
*p < .10 
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Transactive memory. The transactive memory variable was computed using the 
means of the Agreement, Accuracy, and Strength components for each crew. Table 9 
shows the correlations between the components and the transactive memory variable. 
Strength showed the highest correlation with transactive memory and Accuracy the 
lowest. While the three components showed good correlations with trans active memory, 
the relationships among the components themselves were interesting. None of the 
components was significantly related to another. Moreland and colleagues ( 1998) 
reported highly correlated components, but this may have been due to common method 
variance. Additionally, Strength and Accuracy exhibit a negative (but nonsignificant) 
relationship with .one another (see Table 9). 
T bl 9 C a e 1 . orre at10ns b etween transact1ve memory components 
Agreement Accuracy Strength T.M. 
Agreement 
Accuracy .19 
Strength .29 -.19 
T.M. .58*** .55*** .68*** 
***p < .01 
Due to small crew sample size, factor analyses was not appropriate (Byrne, 
1994). However. it seems from the relationships among the components that, as 
measured, the transactive memory variable may consist of more than one factor. A look 
at the descriptive statistics on Accuracy was revealing. Accuracy was very low among 
all the crews. The mean score on Accuracy was .321; the median was .333. The lowest 
crew Accuracy score possible was 0, indicating no accuracy. The highest is 1.0, 
indicating perfect accuracy among crewmembers. This mean and median indicate that 
the crews were very near the point of having only one out of four of the crewmembers 
being accurate on who had what strength. In other words, less than a third of the time 
were crewmembers accurate about crew strengths. 
Theoretically, it seems clear that Accuracy is a legitimate component of 
Transactive memory. It may be that its measurement needs to be improved. 
Crewmembers were asked to delineate between three closely related _strengths: crew 
coordination, technical ability, and systems knowledge. This discrimination task may 
have been too difficult. These results indicate that was indeed the case. 
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In light of the above discussion, the Accuracy component was eliminated from 
the analyses. Due to the elimination of the Accuracy component and because the 
remaining components were not significantly correlated, each component of transactive 
memory was used separately to identify its effects on performance. This use of 
individual components (i.e. no combining of components) is in accord with 
recommendations of previous research (Moreland et al., 1998). Analyses indicated that 
only the Strength component was of value as a separate and individual variable, while 
Agreement showed little relation to the criterion variables. Strength was the self-
reported measure of how well crewmembers know one another's strengths. It is much 
easier to collect, measure, and judge than are the other two components of transactive 
memory. 
Collective efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured from four items on the 
survey using three different scales. The scales were then combined and averaged 
through z scores. The scales showed good interater reliability between individuals; 
Cronbach's (1957) alpha was .68. 
Criterion Variables. The two criterion variables, Critiques per Crew and Overall 
Crew Evaluation exhibited a highly significant positive relationship (r = .63, p = .002). 
Keep in mind, that Critiques per Crew were reverse scored so that higher critiques per 
crew indicated better crew performance. 
Hypothesis 1,2,3. After the data were examined for normality and the two 
aggregate variables were analyzed, the hypotheses were tested in turn. The first three 
hypotheses, state that teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform 
teams with lower levels of transactive memory with greater than three team members 
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and in the field. Therefore, crews with higher transactive memory scores should have 
higher performance scores. After controlling for experience and ability (hours, mission 
qualified duration, distinguished graduate status, instructors on board, and flights in the 
last 90 days), there were indications of a positive relationship between one transactive 
memory component and performance (see Table 10). Strength demonstrated a strong 
positive relationship with the criterion variables. The relationship failed to reach 
significance primarily due to the small sample size that resulted in only 12 degrees of 
freedom after controlling for the five control variables. Agreement surprisingly revealed 
a negative, but nonsignificant relationship with the criterion variables. This is likely due 
to Agreement's negative relationship with number of instructors on board (r = .49, p = 
.018). Recall from Table 7 that instructors was significantly related to the criterion 
variables. However, since instructors tend to fly with a variety of crews, they exhibited 
lower Agreement scores. These data provide partial support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
T bl 10 Part' al a e 1 1 f corre a ions b etween TM t d r£ . componen s an pe ormance 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Agreement -.10 -.23 
Strength .33 .21 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
Hypothesis 4. According to Hypothesis 4, turnover via the reconstitution of 
teams. will negatively affect transactive memory and performance in tum. As previously 
shown. there is evidence that transactive memory does positively affect performance. To 
test whether turnover affects transactive memory, the crew hardness variable was used. 
Greater crew hardness indicates crews that fly as an integral unit more often. 
Alternatively, a low crew hardness score indicates crewmembers that frequently change 
crews for each flight. To support Hypothesis 4, crew hardness should be highly 
correlated with components of transactive memory, and it was (see Table 11 ). Strength 
exhibits this relationship. Agreement failed to reach statistical significance, due to small 
sample size. This is another indication that Strength may was the more valuable 
predictor variable. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is strongly supported. 
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***p < .01 
Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis states that teams trained together will foster 
development of transactive memory systems which will result in increased performance 
over others trained in separate teams. Since Fairchild is an operational base and not a 
training base, this hypothesis could not be tested. 
Hypothesis 6. Being assigned to the same flying squadron allows crewmembers 
to interact in a flying environment without necessarily flying with one another on a 
frequent basis. Hypothesis 6 suggests that this interaction over time will increase the 
crew's transactive memory. To test this hypothesis, data was collected on how long 
individuals had been assigned to the same squadron. Crews composed of members of 
the same squadron (n=9) were examined to discover a possible correlation between time 
in the squadron and transactive memory components. I hypothesized this would be a 
positive relationship and it was for Strength (see Table 12). Again, Agreement was not a 
useful predictor. 
t bl 11 C a e 
-· 
l . orre atlons b etween squa d ron time an d transactlve memory components 
Time assigned to Squadron 
Agreement .03 
Strength .59** 
**p < .05 
Besides increased opportunity to interact and observe, being in the squadron 
together increases member's chances of flying together·(see Table 13). There are four 
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refueling squadrons located at Fairchild, but members of a squadron generally fly 
together. However, even after controlling for Crew Hardness, time in the squadron is 
still highly related to transactive memory (see Table 13). The relationship failed to reach 
statistical significance for the components of transactive memory, however this can be 
attributed to the small sample size (n=9) of crews from the same squadron. The 
correlations themselves are positive and strong (see Table 13). Overall the results 
provide some support Hypothesis 6, longer time assigned to the squadron is related to 
development of transactive memory. 
T bl 13 C a e 1 . f d .h orre at10ns o squa ron time wit crew h d ar ness an d transactlve memory 
Controllin2 for: Relationship 
Squadron Time - Flights 
r = .55* 
Crew Hardness Squadron Time - Agreement 
r= .27 
Crew Hardness Squadron Time - Strength 
r= .36 
*p < .10 
Hypothesis 7. The seventh hypothesis states that collective efficacy will be a 
predictor of flight crew performance. To test this hypothesis, collective efficacy was 
correlated with both of the performance criterion variables. After controlling for 
experience and ability collective efficacy demonstrates a strong relationship with 
performance (see Table 14). 
T bl 14 P . 1 C a e artia 1 . orre at1ons b 11 etween co ective e ffi d ~ 1cacy an per ormance 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Collective efficacy .62*** .47** 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
** p < .05. ***p < .01 
Two multiple regressions were also conducted, regressing each performance 
variable onto the five control variables and collective efficacy. Both overall F-tests were 
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significant (for Critiques per Crew: F=2.53, p<.10, 2-tailed; for Overall Crew 
Evaluation: F=2.44, p<. l 0, 2-tailed). The lower p values can be attributed to a large 
number of control variables in comparison to a smaller sample size. Of greater 
importance is the change in R squared of the regressions after controlling for experience 
and ability. The values are displayed in Table 15. 
Table 15. Results of the analyses for performance regressed onto collective efficacy 
after controlling for experience and ability 
Collective efficacy 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Change in Rsq = .28 
Fchange = 7.64** 
Change in Rsq = .12 
Fchange = 3.33* 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
*p < .10, ** p < .05 
The table highlights the fact that crew collective efficacy is explaining a healthy 
portion of the variance in performance, particularly in Critiques per Crew, after 
controlling for experience and ability variables. These finding strongly support 
Hypothesis 7; collective efficacy predicts crew performance. 
Hypothesis 8. Transactive memory will explain variance in flight crew 
performance, above and beyond that of collective efficacy. The preceding results clearly 
indicate that collective efficacy explains variance in performance. Previously, evidence 
was presented indicating that the Strength component of transactive memory was 
positively related to performance. but not at a statistically significant level. Partial 
correlations were conducted to examine if the transactive memory components explain 
variance above and beyond that of collective efficacy. When the effects of the five 
control variables and collective efficacy were partialed out, Strength showed a nearly 
zero relationship to performance (p>.10). Hypothesis 8 is not supported, transactive 
memory does not predict performance above and beyond that of collective efficacy. 
Further Analyses After reviewing the results above. additional analyses were 
conducted to further examine the powerful variable. collective efficacy. Mischel and 
Northcraft ( 1997) suggest that greater experience and ability should lead to higher 
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collective efficacy. Bivariate correlations between the five control factors and collective 
efficacy support this contention (see Table 16). Correlations are clearly positive, except 
for Flights in the last 90 days which is an indication of less experience as discussed 
earlier. 
Table 16. Correlations between control variables and collective efficacy. 
Collective efficacy 
Total Hours .33* 
Mission Qualified Duration .27 
Distinguished Graduate (Dummy Variable) .22 
Instructors Onboard .43* 
Flights (Last 90 days) -.16 
*p < .10 
It seems likely that higher levels of transactive memory will lead to higher collective 
efficacy as discussed in Chapter 2 (Mischel & Northcraft, 1997; Gist & Mitchell, 1992; 
Bandura, 1982). Partialing out the effects of experience and ability, correlations were 
conducted between transactive memory components and collective efficacy. There is a 
clear and strong relationship between the two as exhibited in Table 17 for Strength. 
Agreement exhibited no relationship with collective efficacy, providing further evidence 
that Strength is the most important predictor variable. 
Table 17. Correlations between transactive memory and collective efficacy controlling 





Is it possible to show that Crew Hardness is related to collective efficacy? 
Intuitively it seems reasonable that a crew that flies together often would develop higher 
collective efficacy. Further analyses were conducted to determine if crew hardness 
,-------------------------------------~~--
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would directly predict collective efficacy. Crew hardness was positively correlated with 
collective efficacy, however, this relationship was mediated by Strength (see Table 18). 
This supports the contention that the mechanism that translates crew hardness into 
collective efficacy is transactive memory. Agreement did not mediate this relationship. 
This is not surprising given the fact that there was no relationship between Agreement 
and collective efficacy (see Table 17). 
Table 18. Correlations between collective efficacy and crew hardness and transactive 
memo 
Controlling for: 




** p < .05 
Discussion of Study 2 
In the second study, collective efficacy was the key variable in explaining aircrew 
performance. As hypothesized, collective efficacy was clearly related to both criterion 
variables. A component of transactive memory, Strength, was positively related to 
performance as well, but did not reach statistical significance. With increased sample 
size, transactive memory may indeed be predictive of performance. However, the results 
of Study 2 indicate that the transactive memory was strongly related to collective 
efficacy, which was not hypothesized. but is in accord with theory on collective efficacy 
(Mischel & Northcraft. 1997). 
Of the transactive memory components, it is clear that Strength was the most 
potent predictor of both performance and collective efficacy. Moreland and colleagues 
(1998) reported highly correlated transactive memory components in their lab studies 
using radio assembly. Similar to this study. they had planned to examine the effect of 
each component separately. However, because the components were highly correlated a 
combined measure of transactive memory was used by Moreland. This ·high correlation 
may have been due to common method variance. \Vhat is clear from Study 2 is that 
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Strength was the "star performer". This is a positive finding. Strength is much easier to 
collect and calculate than are the other two components. It is simply a self-report 
measure of how well each crewmember knows the strengths of other crewmembers using 
a five-point lickert scale. Whereas Agreement requires a series of questions concerning 
"who does what and who knows what". The Agreement score must be calculated by 
comparing responses across crewmembers for each question which is time consuming. 
Furthermore, it requires the researcher to generate the series of questions for each type of 
task. Similarly, a researcher would be required to generate a list of items to be scored 
individually for the Accuracy component. As was seen in Study 2, finding the right 
series of questions may be difficult. Floor and ceiling effects must be avoided. Study 2 
suffered from floor effects. 
The major variable of interest, transactive memory, was found to be effected 
negatively by increased turnover, as hypothesized. Consistently substituting 
crewmembers onto crews adversely affects transactive memory. The more a crew flies 
together as a unit, the higher their transactive memory. Additionally, transactive 
memory clearly mediated a strong crew hardness - collective efficacy relationship. 
Transactive memory seems to be the mechanism through which crew hardness is 
translated into collective efficacy. 
Finally, it seems that flying crewmembers from the same squadron as a crew is 
associated with higher levels of transactive memory. The evidence presented supports 
this contention. Because crewmembers from the same squadron have greater 
opportunity to fly together, this finding was not surprising. However, even after 
controlling for these increased flying opportunities; increased time in the squadron was 
associated with higher levels of transactive memory. This finding is not as intuitive. 
Overall, these results suggest the series of relationships exhibited in Figure 4. 
Crew Hardness 
Time in Squadron 
Transactive memory 7 
(Strength) 
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Experience & Ability 
'IV ~ 
Collective efficacy 7 Performance 
Figure 4. A revised model of the transactive memory/ collective efficacy process. 
Transactive memory is positioned in such a way that indicates that it is predictive 
of collective efficacy. This seems to be the logical sequence. Intuitively, it would seem 
that a crew that better knows who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what, 
would be a more confident crew. It is less likely that because a crew is more confident 
they would then acquire such a knowledge system. This model conflicts slightly with the 
model proposed by Peterson et al. (1996). They found that early collective efficacy 
predicted later shared mental models. There are key differences between Study 2 and the 
Peterson et al. (1996) study. First, the teams in Peterson et al. had little history as a team 
prior to the first measurement of collective efficacy and mental models. Whereas, in 
many cases the teams in Study 2 had a well established history before the study began. 
Second, shared mental models and transactive memory are similar, but not identical 
constructs. It seems reasonable that it would take time to establish shared mental 
models, and with no prior history it was unlikely that such models would emerge early in 
a team's tenure. Alternatively, there could be clues early in a team's development about 
who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what, and therefore transactive 
. memory could perhaps be established more quickly than shared mental models. 
It should be noted that these results do not infer that crews with lower collective 
efficacy perform poorly on flights. Nor do they infer that lower transactive memory 
leads to poor performance. Indeed the majority of the crews evaluated were satisfactory 
performers. Only one crew of nineteen received an unsatisfactory evaluation rating. 
Additionally, 14 of the 19 crews were rated as "average" or better by the evaluators. It 
seems that the majority of the crews were good performers. 
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So it seems that higher collective efficacy separates the "exceptional" crew from 
the "average" crew. Variables which improve collective efficacy are crew hardness (lack 
of turnover), transactive memory, and of course experience and ability. So it seems that 
whatever the squadron leadership can do to keep crews together, would be beneficial to 
their crew confidence and performance in tum. Experience and ability are also 
indicative of the "exceptional crew". Increasing the number of instructors on board 
increases both collective efficacy and performance. However, during this period when 
the Air Force is facing nearly a crisis situation in failing to retain highly experienced 
aircrewmembers (Wall Street Journal, 2 June 1999), squadron leadership has a 
dwindling capability to just "put more instructors on board". They must find other 
means to increase crew confidence. Flying crews together and thereby increasing 
transactive memory seems to be one way the leadership can influence confidence and 
performance. 
The data suggest that instructors tend to fly together less often than the "line" 
flyers and this is as it should be. However, I propose that if instructors flew as hard 
crews more often, they would improve their performance scores to an even greater 
degree. It is also possible that higher transactive memory levels of less experienced 
crews may help to keep their performance from dipping to unsatisfactory levels. 
This study also informs theory on the development of collective efficacy. Results 
seem clear that one way to increase the team's collective efficacy is through transactive 
memory. Developing the team member's ability to determine who knows what, who 
does what. and who is good at what should increase team confidence. Previous 
theoretical work has pointed to the important role of enactive mastery (Bandura, 1982) in 
developing collective efficacy. It seems that at least one vehicle used by enactive 
mastery to translate experience into efficacy is transactive memory. This has important 
implications for efficacy theory. 
Theoretically, there seem to be two determinants of transactive memory. First, as 
Moreland and colleagues ( 1998) discovered, a team working on a task together over time 
mcreases transactive memory. This study supports this previous theoretical and 
empirical work by showing that greater crew hardness leads to higher transactive 
memory. 
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Second, it seems that a team may not be required to be engaged in their primary 
task to increase their transactive memory. It seems that other conditions besides flying 
together may help build transactive memory. One such variable is time together in an 
organization; in this case a flying squadron. People talk, you hear rumors, you see 
people interact during mission planning, in flying safety meetings, etc., and you get some 
idea of how competent they are around an airplane. You get some idea (by observing 
and / or listening) whattheir strengths and weaknesses are as well. Simply interacting 
and observing over time while engaged in auxiliary activities related to the primary task 
may be sufficient to increase the team's transactive memory. A practical application of 
this finding is to encourage organizational member interactions in discussions and or 
exercises related to the task or task components. This would be especially important if a 
team cann~t be frequently engaged in the task due to expense, time, etc. Group 
techniques such as "pulling part success" via the sharing of "war stories" may be one 
vehicle to increase transactive memory. Another practical application is to encourage 
leadership to compose crews from the same squadron whenever possible. 
The major shortcoming of this study was the small number of crews evaluated. 
The inspectors hoped to have a sample size of 25 crews. However, real world 
commitments such as the Kosovo ·crisis, drastically reduced the number of crews 
available to be evaluated. This smaller sample size likely kept the transactive memory -
performance relationship from reaching significance. However, with the negative also 
comes with a positive. Several strong relationships were found even with a small sample 
size. This is indicative of some robust relationships among the variables; in particular 
those related to collective efficacy and performance. 
Study 2 provided a rigorous field test of transactive memory and collective 
efficacy in an operational Air Force environment. It is one of the few tests of such 
constructs outside of the laboratory. In an effort to extend the understanding of the role 
of transactive memory and collective efficacy in aircrew performance, a second study of 
Air Force KC-135 crews was conducted at Altus AFB. OK. The site provided an 
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opportunity to replicate the results of study .2 on a similar sample. However, there were 
important differences between the two samples. Fairchild AFB is an operational base 
while Altus AFB is a training base for new KC-135 crewmembers. This results in two 
different atmospheres: a mission first versus a training first focus. Furthermore, there 
was a variation in experience, Fairchild providing the "average" crewmember, while 
Altus has the "new" KC-135 crewmember. 
Chapter 6 




Study 3 was similar to Study 2. Study 3 used Air Force flight teams at Altus 
AFB, Oklahoma. Altus AFB primarily differs from Fairchild AFB in that it is a training 
base, where KC-135 crews receive initial qualification training in the KC-135. Levels of 
transactive memory and collective efficacy were evaluated prior to an operational aircraft 
check flight. Independent evaluators provided performance measures for the flight. 
Subjects and Setting 
Subjects were actual Air Force KC-135 aircrews undergoing qualification 
training at Altus AFB in Altus, Oklahoma. Altus is the primary KC-135 training base 
for the United States Air Force. The aircraft and aircrew positions are similar to those 
described in Study 2. Crew positions are identical with one exception. Altus is 
beginning a transition to the KC-135 with a Pacer Crag modification. This modification 
includes advanced navigation equipment available to the pilots and this eliminates the 
need for a Navigator. Crews flying the Pacer Crag do not employ a Navigator. Six of 
the fifteen aircraft used in this sample were Pacer Crag modified. 
A total of 44 crewmembers participated. However, one of those individuals was 
on an aircraft with only one trainee and was dropped from the sample. This resulted in a 
sample of 43 (of a possible 45) individuals and a total of 15 aircrews. Only trainees were 
surveyed on the checkflight; of the 15 crews only two trainees failed to respond. On 
several flights, permanent party instructors (those assigned to instruct at Altus, n=9) 
served as crcwmembcrs for positions with no trainees and were not surveyed. Subjects 
served on a volunteer basis. No gender data were available. 
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Procedure and Task 
At Altus, the AC, Co, Nav, and Boom are undergoing initial qualification in the 
aircraft. Therefore, each training flight is conducted under the supervision of an 
instructor in that respective position. The Instructor Pilot (IP) supervises both AC and 
Copilot training. The AC in training is generally upgrading from the copilot position, 
but is sometimes transitioning from another aircraft. Other than the AC in training, the 
crewmembers are new to the aircraft. At the end of the training program ( after 
approximately eight training flights, depending on weather and training continuity) the 
trainees receive a checkride similar to the one described in Study 2 to determine their 
suitability to be declared proficient in the KC-135. During the checkride, the trainees do 
not fly with an instructor, but rather with an evaluator who is expert in that crew 
position. 
During the training program, trainees were briefed on and encouraged to 
participate in the research process by squadron leadership. As part of their mission 
planning package prior to their checkride, aircrew members received a package of 
surveys similar to the one used at Fairchild AFB (see Appendix I). The surveys were 
filled out anonymously by the crewmembers, returned to the crew envelope, and sealed. 
The envelopes were then mailed to the investigator by the squadron administration 
section. The survey assessed transactive memory, collective efficacy, total flight hours, 
and whether the crewmember was a distinguished graduate from flight training. After 
the checkride was completed, the evaluator filled out a questionnaire regarding the 
aircrew's performance on the checkride. This questionnaire focused on transactive 
memory, and overall aircrew performance (see Appendix G). Both questionnaires were 
accompanied by a cover letter (see Appendix H). The same portions o_f the survey were 
analyzed in Studies 2 and 3 so that comparisons could be drawn between the samples. 
Measures 
Collective Efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured exactly as described in 
Study 2. 
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Transactive memory. Transactive memory was measured as described in Study 
2. As will be highlighted in the Results section, Accuracy again demonstrated a low 
mean. Due to this fact, coupled with a desire to remain consistent across studies, 
analyses were only conducted using the two transactive memory components, Agreement 
and Strength. 
Crew Training Hardness. Originally Study 3 was designed to have two training 
conditions comparing crews trained as integral crews versus those trained in a random 
crew pattern. Until recently the two squadrons at Altus practiced these two training 
methods. Recently, the second squadron began to shift to an integral or "hard crew" 
training philosophy because they felt that it provided better training for the crews. Due 
to these changes in crew scheduling, a different measure of "crew training hardness" was 
used to determine how transactive memory;performance, collective efficacy, and crew 
· training hardness relate. 
Crew training hardness is a construct that captures how often the trainees fly as 
an integral crew. Crew training hardness was calculated by summing the number of 
times during the program that the trainees flew with other crewmembers of the 
checkflight crew. This number was then divided by the total number of dyads possible. 













The Crew Training Hardness score would be: (7 + 0 + 4 + 0 + 4 + O] / 6 = 2.5 
Figure 5 . .-\n illustration of how Crew Training Hardness totals were calculated. 
Crew Training Hardness was also calculated between only trainees (ignoring 
dyads with permanent party instructors) on board the flight. Results of analyses using 
the Crew Training Hardness variable did not change. Therefore, crew training hardness 
----------------------------------~--------
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as calculated in the example will be reported. Number of flights together was·a self-
report item. 
Control Variables. Two control variables were included to account for individual 
differences in ability and experience. The first was total hours per trainee. This was a 
self-report measure. Hours for the trainees were added for the crew and then divided by 
the number of trainees on board. The total hours did not include those of the permanent 
party instructors flying as crewmembers on the flight. These data were excluded 
primarily so as not to skew the hours data for the trainees, who were the subjects of 
interest. Additionally, these data were not available and since the instructors were not 
being evaluated they were considered to be of no importance. As a footnote, all the 
instructors at Altus have a similar number of total flying hours. 
The second control variable was number of instructors on board. In Study 2 this 
was an important variable. It should be noted that the number of instructors on board has 
a different meaning in Study 3. At Fairchild, an instructor was either being evaluated or 
vulnerable to be evaluated. This was not the case at Altus. Permanent party instructors 
were not evaluated on the trainees' checkrides. Rather, they simply acted as competent 
crewmembers filling a position on the aircraft and were treated as peers by the trainees. 
Therefore, each instructor on board represented "one less person to worry about" for the 
trainees. While they still interacted as fellow crewmembers, the trainees knew that the 
instructors would not intentionally ignore proper procedures and techniques. Due to 
their vast experience, the instructors could be counted on by the trainees to do a 
proficient job without close monitoring and scrutiny. This potentially allowed the 
trainees to primarily focus monitoring and attention towards the other .trainee 
crewmembers on board. It also provided less opportunities for critiques of crew 
coordination by the evaluators. While the trainees could be critiqued for improper 
coordination with the instructors, it was highly unlikely that the instructor would engage 
in such actions or communication so as to be critiqued for his or her interaction with the 
trainee. The presence of instructors also provided a more stable environment, which 
should enhance the Overall Crew Evaluation rating. Number of instructors on board was 
determined by trainee answers to item 6 of the student surYey (see Appendix I). 
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Initially, Distinguished graduate status from undergraduate flying programs was 
to be a third control variable. However, only 3 of 43 respondents reported being a 
distinguished graduate. As a result, this variable was dropped as a control variable. 
The other two control variables in Study 2 were not suitable for Study 3. 
Duration of mission qualification was not applicable as these trainees were not yet 
mission qualified. The number of flights in the last 90 days was also not applicable. 
These trainees were at Altus for the previous 90-day period undergoing training, 
therefore, the number of flights was very similar across subjects. 
Results 
Determination of Shmificance. Similar to Study 2 and for the same reasons, an 
alpha significance level of .10 was chosen for Study 3. All p values reported will be 
one-tailed unless noted otherwise. 
Descriptive Statistics. The variables of interest in this study were either 
measured at the crew level or measured at the individual level and then aggregated to the 
crew level. Therefore, checks for normality and other descriptive statistics were 
performed on the crew level variables. A visual inspection of the data revealed no 
serious departures from normality. 
Control Variables. The two control variables in Study 3 were the hours per 
trainee on the aircraft and the number of permanent party instructors on board. When it 
is stated that experience and ability were controlled for, these two control variables are 
the reference. Table 19 depicts the correlations between the control variables and 
performance. 
T bl 19 C a e 1 . orre at10ns b etween contro an d t . bl per ormance vana es 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
( Objective Performance) (Subjective Performance) 
Total Hours per trainee .04 .06 
Instructors Onboard .17 .31 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
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Not surprisingly, hours per trainee were not significantly related to performance. 
This is a training environment where the aircraft is new and unfamiliar to all but the AC 
(and sometimes the AC can be new to the aircraft). Those with more previous flying 
time generally tend to possess more "airsense" on the first couple of training flights. 
However, by the time of the checkride evaluation, crewmembers are generally on equal 
footing in regards to time in the aircraft and so effects of previous flying experience are 
diminished. This is in contrast to the Fairchild study where previous flying experience 
almost always translated into previous KC-135 experience. At-test revealed that the 
Altus sample was significantly lower (p<.001) in terms of flying hours per crewmember 
than was the Fairchild sample. 
As was seen at Fairchild, number of instructors on board had a positive 
correlation with crew evaluations (see Table 19). This relationship failed to reach 
significance due to small sample size. This finding was not surprising due to the positive 
effect of the presence of instructors discussed earlier. 
Transactive memory. The transactive memory variable was initially computed 
using the means of the Agreement, Accuracy, and Strength components for each crew. 
Table 20 shows the correlations between the components and the transactive memory 
variable. Accuracy showed the highest correlation with transactive memory and 
Agreement the lowest. This is in contrast to Fairchild, where Strength showed the 
highest and Accuracy the lowest correlation with transactive memory. Why the 
difference between Study 1 and 2? At Altus only trainees completed surveys, so on most 
crews there were fewer individuals completing the accuracy rating on one another, 
increasing the likelihood of greater accuracy. For example the highest Accuracy score 
recorded by a crew was a perfect 1.0. However this crew only contained two trainees. 
Therefore, the two trainees had to only agree on one another's greatest strength judgment 
and the evaluator's judgment (a total of 4 agreements) to produce the perfect Accuracy 
score. In contrast, a crew of four trainees would have to agree on three others· greatest 
strength judgments plus the evaluator's judgments (a total of 24 agreements) to produce 
a perfect 1.0 score. Furthermore. the crew recording the second highest Accuracy score 
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also contained just two trainees. It is clear that the Accuracy score could be easily 
skewed by number of trainees on board. Indeed, Accuracy was negatively correlated 
with number of trainees on board (r = -.38, p = .085). 
As in Study 2, the Altus crews also scored very low on the Accuracy component. 
This is surprising given that possibility for greater accuracy with fewer crewmembers 
completing ratings. Indeed, crews did score slightly higher on Accuracy at Altus (mean 
.348) over Fairchild (mean .321), but the difference was not statistically significant. 
Similar to Study 2, only about a third of the time were crewmembers accurate about crew 
strengths 
As in Study 2, none of the transactive memory components were significantly 
related to another. Because of the suspect nature of the Accuracy scores, their low 
means, and in order to remain consistent across studies, Accuracy was dropped from the 
analyses in Study 3. Therefore, the components of transactive memory used in Study 2 
(Agreement and Strength) will also be reported for Study 3. 
T bl 20 C a e l . orre atlons b etween transacuve memory component s 
Agreement Accuracy Strength T.M. 
Agreement 
Accuracy .19 
Strength .19 .07 
T.M. .49** .85*** .52** 
**p < .05. ***p < .01 
Collective efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured from four items on the 
survey using three differem scales. The scales were then combined and averaged 
through z scores. The scales showed good interater reliability between individuals; 
Cronbach·s (1957) alpha was .73. 
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Criterion Variables. Unlike Study 2, the two criterion variables, Critiques per 
Crew and Overall Crew Evaluation did not exhibit a significant positive relationship (r = 
.14, n.s.). Keep in mind, that Critiques per Crew were reverse scored so that higher 
critiques per crew indicated better crew performance. There are two possible 
explanations for this result. First, the Overall Crew Evaluation rating could have been 
influenced by the presence of permanent party instructors acting as crewmembers during 
the trainee's flight. This presence could have created "a halo effect" for the trainees by 
giving the impression that the trainee's crew coordination skills were stronger than they 
actually were. The smooth crew effectiveness could actually have been facilitated by the 
presence of the instructors, not the abilities of the trainees. Support for this argument is 
derived from the positive correlations between number of instructors on board and 
Overall Crew Evaluation shown in Table 19. The correlation is higher than that of the 
Instructor - Critiques per Crew value. 
On the other hand, the Critiques per Crew rating could be in error. Because it is a 
training environment, there tend to be a greater number of critiques on a checkride at 
Altus compared to an operational base such as Fairchild. It may be more difficult to 
separate the critiques related to effective crew functioning and other types of critiques. 
As a result, the Critiques per Crew value may not be as accurate as it would be in an 
environment with less total critiques. Likely due to the inexperience of the ratees, the 
mean number of Critiques per Crewmember was nearly double at Altus (mean = 1.625) 
of what it was for Fairchild (mean = .886). These greater number of critiques, leave 
open the possibility that it was more difficult to separate crew functioning critiques from 
individual critiques. 
In sum. it is difficult to identify the most appropriate Criterion variable in Study 
3. Therefore, results using both criterion variables will be reported, keeping in mind that 
any disparity in results must be questioned. 
Hypothesis l,2,3. After the data were examined for normality and the two 
aggregate variables were analyzed, the hypotheses were tested in turn. The first three 
hypotheses. state that teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform 
teams with lower levels of transactive memory with greater than three team members 
and in the field. Therefore, crews with higher transactive memory scores should have 
higher performance scores. After partialing out the effects of experience and ability, 
transactive memory components do have a positive relationship with the performance 
variables (see Table 21) 
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Table 21. Partial correlations between T.M. components and performance 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Agreement -.13 .21 
Strength .34 .20 
#· Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
***p < .01 
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Strength demonstrated positive relationships with both criterion variables. It is 
noteworthy that these correlations are very similar to those in Study 2 (see Table 10), 
indicating high consistency in these·relationships across samples. Unfortunately, due to 
small sample size, none of these correlations reached a statistically significant level. 
Agreement demonstrated a positive relationship with Overall Crew Evaluation, but a 
nonsignificant negative relationship with Critiques per Crew. Recall, that the two 
criterion variables were not highly correlated. Taken as a whole, there is some support 
for Hypotheses 1-3, that transactive memory positively influences performance. 
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 deals with the effect of turnover on transactive 
memory and performance in turn. This idea is considered in Hypothesis 5, by using a 
measure of consistency in crew composition. See the Hypothesis 5 section for the 
results. 
Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis concerns the effects of training on performance. 
It was hypothesized that teams trained together will foster development of transactive 
memory systems which will result in increased performance over others trained in 
separate teams: 
Previously. we saw that there was evidence that transactive memory components 
predict performance. Bivariate correlations were conducted to determine the relationship 
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between crew training hardness and transactive memory. Strength showed strong 
positive correlations with crew training hardness (see Table 22). Similar to Study 2 (see 
Table 11 ), Agreement was not related to crew hardness. Again, this is an indication that 
Strength is the most effective predictor of the transactive memory components. The 
strong relationship between crew training hardness and Strength supports the contention 
that training crews together positively effects transactive memory. These results also 
support Hypothesis 4, that increased turnover will negatively effect transactive memory 
and performance in turn. 




**p < .05 
In further analyses, partial correlations were conducted to test whether Crew 
Training Hardness predicted performance after controlling for experience and ability. 
Results indicate that Crew Training Hardness had practically no relationship with either 
Critiques per Crew (r=.03, n.s.) or Overall Crew Evaluation (r=-.07, n.s.) after 
controlling for experience and ability. In sum, Hypothesis 5 is supported. 
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 deals with the duration of squadron assignment 
being positively related to transactive memory. Aircrews trained and evaluated at Altus 
are kept within the same squadron, therefore, this hypothesis could not be tested. 
Hypothesis 7. The seventh hypothesis states that collective efficacy will be a 
valid predictor of flight crew performance. To test this hypothesis, collective efficacy 
was correlated with both the performance criterion variables. After controlling for 
experience and ability, collective efficacy demonstrated no significant relationship with 
performance (see Table 23). 
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Table 23. Partial Correlations between collective efficac and erformance 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Collective efficacy -.09 .18 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
These results yvere surprising in light of previous research and the results of 
Study 2. It seems that the young training crews at Altus may have been suffering from a 
naive sense of overconfidence. When their confidence levels are compared with those of 
the more mature and experienced crews at Fairchild, the Altus crews show higher 
efficacy levels (t32= 1.43, p=.081 ). The results are more starkly contrasted in one of the 
four collective efficacy components; confidence level that at least one member of the 
crew will receive an "Exceptional Performance" rating on the checkride. Exceptional 
Performance (EP) ratings are rare (given to approximately 10% of all evaluatees) and 
therefore confidence of its occurrence should be lower. However, the Altus crews 
showed significantly higher levels (t32=2.36, p=.012) of efficacy on this component (see 
Table 24) 
Table 24. Collective efficacy levels at Altus and Fairchild 
% Confident of an 
Exceptional Performance 
Ratin 
**p < .05 
Altus Fairchild 
75.39** 62.46 
These results could indicate a failure to predict due to inflated efficacy levels or 
perhaps efficacy's inability to predict performance with a lack of experience and ability. 
Regardless of the reasoning, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
Hvpothesis 8. Hypothesis 8 asserts that transactive memory will explain variance 
in flight crew performance, above and beyond that of collective efficacy. Previously we 
saw indications that transactive memory was predictive of performance after controlling 
for experience and ability. Does this relationship change when we control for the effects 
of collecti\'e efficacy? Correlations between transactive memory components and 
performance were conducted controlling for the effects of experience, ability, and 
collective efficacy. The results are seen in Table 25. 
Table 25. Correlations between T.M. components and performance controlling for 
collective efficacy 
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation 
Agreement -.12 .19 
Strength .36 .17 
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance 
***p < .01 
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Whe_n compared with the Results of Table 21 where only experience and ability 
were controlled for, it is clear that the relationships between transactive memory 
components and performance showed minimal change. This indicates that collective 
efficacy did not mediate the transactive memory - performance relationship. Due to the 
small sample size the relationships did not reach statistical significance. However, the 
relationships are clearly in the positive direction for Strength and in once case for 
Agreement. On the whole, these results provide partial support for Hypothesis 8. 
Further Analyses As was done in Study 2, further analyses were conducted to 
inv·estigate the relationships of other variables with the key variables of transactive 
memory and collective efficacy. Bivariate correlations between the two control factors 
and collective efficacy were examined first (see Table 26). Correlations are lower than 
in Study 2, and surprisingly collective efficacy showed no relationship with hours per 
trainee or number of instructors on board. This provides evidence that collective 
efficacy scores were naively inflated as will be explored in the Discussion section. 
Table 26. Correlations between control variables and collective efficacy 
Collective efficacy 
Total Hours -.02 
Instructors Onboard .11 
Also as in Study 2, partial correlations were conducted between transactive 
memory components and collective efficacy (see Table 27). The relationship between 
Strength and collective efficacy was not nearly as strong (about one third as strong, see 
Table 17 for contrast) as it was in Study 2. However, the relationship between the two 
was positive. Again results failed to attain statistical significance due to small crew 
sample size. Agreement showed little relationship with collective efficacy in either 
study. 
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Table 27. Correlations between transactive memory and collective efficacy controlling 




Discussion of Study 3 
Two findings stand out in Study 3. First are the encouraging results indicating a 
positive relationship between transactive memory and performance. While failing to 
reach statistical significance, these results clearly indicated a positive relationship 
between transactive memory components and performance after controlling for 
experience and ability. Strength again was the most potent transactive memory 
component, while Agreement offered little explanatory power. The second finding was 
the diminished importance of collective efficacy in predicting performance at Altus AFB 
(vis-a-vis Fairchild). Both of the findings need to be explored in the light of higher 
collective efficacy levels and the different environments involved. 
The training crews at Altus clearly exhibited higher overall efficacy levels than 
the Fairchild crews. In particular they were much more confident of attaining the highest 
( and rare) performance rating of "Exceptional Performance". It would seem that the 
crews were a bit naive on this poim. It could be that the training crews were unaware 
(due to lower experience with checkrides) of the difficulties involved with doing well on . 
the checkride. Alternatively, these high collective efficacy levels could be a form of 
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impression management, where the crews know that it is socially desirable for aircrew 
members to appear confident, or even "cocky". It could be that the instructors failed to 
· give the trainees a realistic expectation concerning checkride results, in particular the 
chance of an EP rating. However, these warnings c·ould have been received from the 
instructors, but not heeded by the trainees. Perhaps in an effort to increase efficacy 
through verbal persuasion (Bandura, 1982), the instructors could have intentionally 
convinced the trainees that they had a high probability of maximum success on the 
checkride. 
Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the trainees' reported higher efficacy 
levels. It is incredulous that a younger, more inexperienced crewmember would have 
higher efficacy scores than a mature KC-135 crewmember. Perhaps this false bravado 
explains the lack of significance of the collective efficacy score with performance. 
There could be a ceiling effect on efficacy and as a result a lack of variance in the 
variable to exhibit predictive power. Evidence for this claim is as follows. Altus crews 
had higher mean scores than Fairchild crews on all four efficacy components ( only one 
reached statistical significance). Two of the efficacy components had a mean rating near 
~he highest possible level for crews at both Fairchild and Altus. The two remaining 
components were "confidence of an EP rating" (with Altus scoring significantly higher) 
and "chances of three critiques or less on the checkride" (with Altus scoring higher, but 
not reaching statistical significance). If these higher means indicate unrealistic collective 
efficacy judgments, these values would increase random error and result in lower 
correlation values. 
Though it is clear that Altus had (unjustifiably) higher collective efficacy levels, 
there may be another reason that collective efficacy lost its predictive power at Altus. 
Altus is a training base where crewmembers have less experience and ability in the KC-
135 aircraft than do crews at an operational base such as Fairchild. Perhaps in the 
absence of high levels of experience and ability, collective efficacy may not separate the 
average crew from the exceptional crew. It may only be at higher levels of ability that 
collective efficacy makes a difference. As an analogy, in professional sports we often 
hear the expression "at this level it becomes a mental game. do you think you can win, 
when the other guy doesn't". Collective efficacy may be a separator at these greater 
experience and ability levels. But during training other constructs may be more 
important. 
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Transactive memory enjoyed a positive relationship with performance with or 
without the presence of collective efficacy. Training together as a team and learning 
"who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what" may be more important 
when becoming proficient at a complex task. It could be that this knowledge allow.s one 
to focus on other aspects of the task and less on the teamwork component. Additionally, 
as hypothesized in the Discussion of Study 2, the higher transactive memory scores of 
less experienced crews may keep their performance from dipping to unsatisfactory 
levels. 
How do the findings of Study 3 compare with the revised model presented in 
Study 2? The answer is: very favorably. Figure 4 is presented again below as Figure 6 
for convenience. 
Crew Hardness 
Time in Squadron 
71 
Transactive memory 7 
(Strength) 
Experience & Ability 
\V ~ 
Collective efficacy 7 Performance 
Figure 6. A revised model of the transacti\'e memory / collective efficacy process. 
The results of Study 3 clearly indicate that Crew Hardness was highly related to 
the transactive memory components. Time in the Squadron was not a variable in Study 
3. Transactive memory and its components were related to collective efficacy, but not to 
the degree seen in Study 2. This could be due to the inflation of collective efficacy or the 
difference in flying environments. 
The control variables of experience and ability were not as important for 
collective efficacy at Altus. This can be explained by remembering that experience and 
ability were much lower at Altus as compared to Fairchild. while collective efficacy was 
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higher at Altus than at Fairchild. The artificial inflation of collective efficacy is likely to 
blame for the lack of relationship between experience, ability, and efficacy. 
Furthermore, it was found that collective efficacy was not predictive of 
performance. This result was somewhat surprising after collective efficacy's strong role 
in performance in Study 2. As was stated earlier, collective efficacy may have been 
naively inflated at Altus. It is also equally likely that collective efficacy's role in 
performance may not be as important when experience and ability are low. Other factors 
(including transactive memory) may play a larger part under these conditions. 
The relationship between transactive memory and performance was quite 
consistent between samples. There are good indications that transactive memory and its 
components are predictive of performance. Unfortunately, due to small sample size these 
correlations did not reach statistical significance. Similarly, it was found that the 
relationship between transactive memory and collective efficacy was positive. However, 
this relationship was not nearly as strong as it was in Study 2. Again, this could be due 
to the collective efficacy inflation at Altus or it could be due to the difference in flying 
environments. Perhaps the role of transactive memory in collective efficacy is weaker in 
situations where experience and ability are not well developed 
The shortcomings of Study 3 are similar to those of Study 2; a small sample size. 
The number .of individuals surveyed was 43. However, once the individuals were placed 
into their crews (which is the variable of interest) the sample size falls to 15. Efforts 
were made to increase the sample size. However two forces acted against this effort. 
First, the investigator could not be on site to encourage and monitor participation. 
Second, a portion of the permanent party instructors at Altus AFB were dispatched to 
participate in the real world conflict in Kosovo. Therefore, those instructors left behind 
were left with an even higher workload than normal. Prior to the conflict, the squadrons 
were already below 100% manning, so the Kosovo deployment worsened an already high 
workload situation. Therefore, instructors did not always make time for returning 
surveys. Additionally, those instructors charged with ensuring the student crews 
received surveys were distracted by other primary duties. 
85 
The flip side of the small sample size issue is the fact that significant findings can 
be viewed as robust relationships among the variables that were not a product of "just 
more data". In particular, strong relationships were found between crew training 
composition and transactive memory. 
The practical applications of these findings are to encourage the leadership at 
Altus AFB to make crew consistency a top priority in scheduling training sorties. This 
should pay off with better performance at the end of the training program. In tum, 
operational squadrons, such as Fairchild, will then be receiving crewmembers able to 
perform at a higher level. Transactive memory was clearly more important to 
performance at Altus than was collective efficacy or even experience and ability. 
Theoretically an examination needs to be made on the relationship of collective 
efficacy and performance with experience and ability as a potential moderator. There is 
some evidence from Study 3 that in a learning or training environment of a complex 
task, collective efficacy may not be important in task performance. Perhaps more 
accurately put, collective efficacy seems to distinguish exceptional and average 
performance only in operational environments. Results of Study 3 indicate that 
collective efficacy does not distinguish such performance in a training environment. Is 
there a theoretical reason why this relationship exists? Are experience and ability 
moderators of the collective efficacy - performance relationship? 
A potential answer to that question and also an area of both theoretical and 
empirical work is the notion of "naive" 9r "inflated" collective efficacy. It seems in 
Study 3, that extremely high collective efficacy levels simply failed to predict 
performance in a meaningful way. But can there be a down-side to inflated collective 
efficacy? Could it actually be harmful for collective efficacy to be naively high? 
Perhaps it could result in reduced vigilance or attention to detail, or perhaps decreased 
motivation. It should be clearly stated that I am making no inference that such dangers 
exist based on the results of this study. Rather. I offer the question as a logical extension 
to the high collective efficacy scores encountered during Study 3. 
On a related manner, is there a way to construct questions in order to more 
accurately gauge collective efficacy? In accordance with the efficacy literature (c.f. Gist 
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and Mitchell, 1992) several of these efficacy questions were stated so as to ask about 
specific performance attainments. It could be that unless individuals have the necessary 
experience with the task or heed instruction from experts on performance levels, they 
may possess improper performance level expectations. Mitchell, Hopper, Daniels, 
George-Falvy, and James (1994) provided empirical evidence in their work on self 
efficacy that predicted performance is harder to judge accurately with less experience: If 
indeed performance levels were difficult to judge at Altus, the young crewmembers 
might have easily fallen prey to inflated collective efficacy. This could especially be the 
case in an environment like the Air Force with high efficacy "demand characteristics". 
In this environment, three of Bandura's (1982) four categories of experience are utilized 
to develop efficacy: 1. Vicarious experience (modeling of other military flyers), 2) verbal 
persuasion (Aim High/ Air Force), and 3) physiological arousal (e.g. anxiety about the 
checkride). 
Each of the three studies on transactive memory offer a unique perspective on the 
construct. Additionally, we have learned much about collective efficacy and 
performance. The next section offers an overall discussion and critique of the three 





Taken together, the results of the lab and two field studies inform our 
understanding of both transactive memory and performance. The field studies clearly 
demonstrated that turnover or failure to train as integral teams can have an adverse effect 
on transactive memory. All three studies showed a positive association between higher 
transactive memory and some elements of performance. The lab study hints at why 
transactive memory may translate into better performance. It seems that crewmembers 
have higher situational awareness of events outside of the cockpit under high transactive 
memory conditions. Perhaps the improved coordination as a result of knowing who 
knows what, who does what, and who is good at what, allows crewmembers to focus on 
important aspects of the situation versus having to closely monitor the actions of fellow 
crewmembers. Furthermore, increased transactive memory may lessen the need for 
verbal coordination of actions. Additionally, crewmembers may feel they are not 
performing as well in a low transactive memory situation and are less confident they can 
gauge other crewmember's situational states under these conditions. 
The relationship of transactive memory and performance seems consistent across 
studies. Transactive memory may help maintain less experienced crewmembers at the 
"average level" of performance and keep them from falling to unsatisfactory levels. 
However, there are indications that under conditions of high experience and ability that 
collective efficacy may mediate the relationship between transactive memory and 
performance. The field studies also indicate that transactive memory is an important 
input into the crew's collective efficacy. The knowledge of one another add to the 
team's confidence. 
Collective efficacy was shown to be a powerful predictor of performance under 
conditions of realistic collective efficacy judgments. Specifically, collective efficacy 
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tends to separate the exceptional crew from the average crew under conditions of 
experience and well-developed ability. However this relationship can be "short-
circuited" when team member's possess a naively inflated sense of collective efficacy. 
Under these conditions transactive memory's effect on collective efficacy can be reduced 
as well. 
Experience and ability were demonstrated to be related to both performance and 
collective efficacy, but not as strongly as one might think. For example, in Study 2 
collective efficacy added a great deal of explanatory power about performance even after 
experience and ability were controlled for. Experience and ability do influence 
collective efficacy, but this relationship is also reduced under inflated efficacy ratings. 
Practical Implications 
Is it important to keep aircrews together during training and in operational 
squadrons? That is one of the key questions that ignited this research. The answer 
seems to be yes. If squadron leadership desires the highest level of performance, they 
should strive to keep crews together. By keeping crews together, transactive memory is 
increased. This increased knowledge of who knows what, who does what, and who is 
good at what may allow the crews to have higher situational awareness outside of the 
cockpit and greater ability to judge one another inside the cockpit. This will positively 
influence performance. Additionally, a crew higher in transactive memory will be a 
more confident crew. Results were clear that crews that know each others strengths well, 
tend to be the crews that are more confident. This finding assumes greater importance, 
when one considers the role of experience and ability. Experience and ability were both 
positively related to collective efficacy in an operational environment. These 
commodities are quickly being lost as the Air Force (and other services) endure retention 
problems. Experience and ability are not quickly or easily replaced. Therefore, other 
measures need to be utilized to keep crew efficacy high. Maintaining high transactive 
. memory through crew integrity is one tool that squadron leadership can control and 
influence. 
Is the price one pays to keep the crew together. worth the additional performance 
earned? Only the leadership can ultimately answer that question, but there are several 
89 
factors to consider. Keeping crews together can be a burden from a scheduling 
perspective; it is sometimes hard to keep individuals together to fly in this high tempo 
operations environment. A potential compromise is offered: For routine missions, crew 
integrity may not be as important. Crews should be able to perform proficiently under 
these circumstances. However, whenever crews will be entering high stress, unknown 
environments, I recommend that a "hard crew" be employed. Perhaps it would be wise · 
to have a few "hard crews" on hand for short notice deployments such as the Kosovo 
crisis. However, the squadron leadership may not have such a luxury. As an alternative, 
crews are sometimes deployed with short notice to a forward location where they then 
wait for hostilities to begin. During this waiting period crews could have several training 
flights together to increase both transactive memory and collective efficacy. This should 
translate into a performance advantage that could make a difference in a crisis situation. 
Anecdotally, the Air Force employed such a strategy during the Desert Shield 
portion of the Southwest Asia campaign. When hostilities began under Desert Storm, 
crews were already configured as "hard crews". Their success rate speaks for itself. 
These studies provide empirical evidence for this practice. 
It should also be mentioned that these results indicate that flying crewmembers 
together from the same squadron. even without many flights together, has advantages. 
These crews tend to have higher transactive memory from simply interacting in a flying 
atmosphere. On bases housing several squadrons, or at forward locations with personnel 
from several squadrons, I recommend that personnel from the same squadron fly together 
as much as possible. 
Limitations 
The most salient of the limitations of this research has already been 
acknowledged. All three studies suffered from a small sample size. Working with 
natural teams whether in the lab or the field, can be expensive and time consuming. It is 
difficult to assemble the various team members for research, especially when they are 
busily engaged in their normal tasks and duties. Study 2 is a classic example of these 
rigors. There were 73 indi Yi dual respondents, which translates into 19 crews for the 
study. There were twenty crews evaluated during the Fairchild inspection. Evaluators 
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had hoped to have at least 25, however, the Kosovo crisis erupted three days before the 
inspection. Nine crews were deployed, resulting in a fewer number available for the 
inspection. Evaluators were delighted to even have 20 crews at that point. 
Keep in mind that there are several positives associated with the samples. The 
lab study enjoyed one of the highest quality subject pools found anywhere in the 
literature. All the aviators had over 1500 hours in military aircraft. Seven of the eight 
were combat veterans of either the Vietnam or Persian Gulf War. One of the participants 
has been the subject of an aviation book chapter with his three "MIG kills" in Vietnam. 
These flight subjects offer greater validity in simulator studies than using college 
students. The same can be said for the field studies where actual KC-135 crews, 
evaluators, and aircraft were employed in the study. A study cannot be conducted in a 
more realistic environment. It seems that the sample size trade-off for the quality of the 
sample itself, was a good one. 
Additionally, strong findings emerged using small sample sizes, indicating robust 
phenomenon at work. For example, the collective efficacy relationships in Study 2 
enjoyed correlations in the .60 range. Crew hardness translated into transactive memory 
with correlations around .50 in both field studies. Transactive memory exhibited an 
extremely consistent relationship with performance across field studies. The sample 
sizes employed make these results even more impressive. 
There are several potential confounds associated with Study 3. With no 
investigator on site, data collection relied on volunteer efforts of several instructors at 
Altus AFB. While their efforts are to be commended. they could not be expected to 
exert that same effort as the Investigator in ensuring a high survey return rate. It is not 
clear how many surveys were issued to crews. Surveys were issued from a central 
dispatch desk. On occasions some crews did not pick up their survey package. On other 
occasions crews picked up more than one package and then discarded the extra package. 
Therefore. it is not known how many crews chose to _respond. However. threats of 
response bias are greatly reduced by considering that I am sampling from a very 
homogenous population. All the trainees at the base encountered similar selection 
procedures into the military in general and into aviation in particular. Training at initial 
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training flying assignments prior to Altus AFB is extremely standardized by the Higher 
Headquarters Standardization and Evaluation Division. Headquarters prides itself on 
consistency in training. It is very likely that each training crew at Altus was more similar 
than different from the next aircrew. 
The evaluator forms were kept simple. The investigator briefed many of the 
evaluators on the specifics of the forms in late February, just prior to data collection. On 
a separate occasion, the chief evaluators were briefed in additional detail and in tum 
covered the form with their personnel at the weekly evaluator's meeting. Results of the 
survey indicate that evaluators avoided "firewalling" their ratings. Firewalling is the 
tendency to give all evaluatees the highest marks possible. The other major rating area, 
Critiques per Crew, was to be translated from the official Air Force evaluation form onto 
the researcher's evaluation form. The only confusion in this case, may be whether a 
critique item could be attributable to crew coordination. In most cases, this would be a 
clear call, however, if several critiques are related, it may be difficult to separate the 
exact number attributable to crew coordination as discussed earlier. 
Another draw back to Study 3 was the mixing of instructors with trainees during 
the evaluation. For example, Crew 1 is having a checkride on the AC and the Co. The 
Boom Operator and Navigator are both students earlier in the training sequence. 
Meanwhile, Crew 2 is having a checkride on the AC and Co also. There are no other 
trainees available, so permanent party instructors acting as regular crewmembers fill the 
Boom Operator and Navigator positions. It can be argued that Crew 2 has it much easier 
as they will not be required to monitor the other crewmembers as closely as they would 
have to do with fellow trainees. They can then focus more on the task at hand. 
Additionally, it could be more difficult for the Evaluator to distinguish if the good crew 
coordination exhibited by Crew 2 is due to their crew coordination skills or due to the 
presence of instructors on board. On the other hand, Crew 1 may possess excellent crew 
coordination skills that are severely challenged by newer trainees on board. 
While the possibility of these factors influencing the finding of Study 3 cannot be 
ruled out, the fact that the "non-checked" positions on a checkride are randomly assigned 
helps to rule out this possibility. Through randomization it is hoped that no systematic 
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performance bias crept into the results. Randomization certainly makes such systematic 
bias less probable. It was desired to have each checkride to be conducted with an 
evaluatee in every position. However, real world constraints make this an impossibility. 
The effects of instructors mixing with trainees is a condition that all skill and ability 
levels have an equal chance of encountering. The same can be said for the issue of 
mixing crewmembers flying their checkride with trainees flying at a much earlier phase 
in their program. 
Due to a shortage of qualified subjects, Study 1 was unable to obtain a fully 
counterbalanced design. The counterbalance is employed to protect against any 
difference in advisors. Sixteen subjects would have been required for such a 
counterbalance. Therefore, the first half of the counterbalance design was employed. T-
tests indicated no difference between subjects during the first week of testing, when any 
adverse effects due to a difference in the advisors would emerge. Additionally, only 
Week 2 results were used in the transactive memory analysis; further eliminating the 
possibility of performance differences due to experimental design. 
The final limitation to the field studies concerns the issue of the measurement of 
transactive memory. It was hoped that the three ·components would exhibit the high 
correlations found by Moreland and colleagues (1998), but they did not. Following their 
suggestion. the individual components of transactive memory were used to investigate 
relationships with the criterion variables and Strength was found to be a reliable 
predictor across studies. The primary measurement issue deals with the Accuracy 
component. It seems clear from the literature that Accuracy is an important component 
of transactive memory. In both Study 2 and 3, the Accuracy component exhibited very 
low mean levels. As a result, the predictive validity of transactive memory may have 
suffered. ·when Accuracy was removed from the transactive memory measurement, the 
construct showed vastly improved criterion related validity. Further studies should 
endeavor to more precisely measure this component. 
Future Research Directions 
The studies described here point to several avenues of future research. Studies 2 
and 3 revealed two different patterns for the collective efficacy - performance 
relationship. Under normal levels of experience, collective efficacy was a potent 
predictor of performance. However, under training conditions, collective efficacy 
demonstrated practically no relationship with performance. Is experience and ability a 
moderator of the Collective efficacy - Performance relationship? Further studies, 
especially in the field, should be conducted by manipulating experience levels and 
examining if and how the collective efficacy - performance link is changed. 
Alternatively, collective efficacy and performance could be contrasted for two 
conditions, a training condition and a "mature condition" where the task has been well 
learned. Another interesting test would be a longitudinal approach where collective 
efficacy - performance relationships are tested for crews during training and then later 
once the skills have been mastered. 
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On a related matter, collective efficacy was found to be highly positively related 
to transactive memory in Study 2, but much less so in Study 3. Again, does the 
relationship of collective efficacy and transactive memory change depending on the 
training or experience level of the participant? This issue could be addressed in similar 
manner to the collective efficacy - performance issue described above. 
The differences in the transactive memory, collective efficacy, and performance 
relationships listed above could be attributed to a false or naive sense of collective 
efficacy. Study 3 revealed inflated collective efficacy levels on the part of new trainees. 
Can these inflated collective efficacy levels be harmful to performance? Is it possible 
that such inflated levels may lead to a false sense of security and a resulting lack of 
vigilance. Alternatively, the inflated levels could lead the subject to attempt a 
performance level that could be harmful to the subject or others involved. It could also 
be that these inflated levels simply "wash-out" any predictive power on the part of 
collective efficacy and are otherwise not harmful. Testing of these hypotheses would be 
difficult. Manipulating collective efficacy levels in order to test for dangerous results 
would be unethical. 
The inflated collective efficacy issue also highlights the importance of 
researchers thinking through the efficacy questions posed to respondents in order to 
protect against such inflated ratings. However, as was seen in these exa~ples, the 
94 
questions had a very specific nature and were still inflated for the training groups. 
Researchers cannot control all of the subject's bents. 
Future research should also focus on how to best measure the Accuracy 
component of transactive memory. Moreland and colleagues ( 1998) were able to 
consistently measure Accuracy when it came to a very concrete result such as wiring a 
radio. They found Accuracy levels comparable to both Agreement and Strength levels. 
Study 2 and 3 required a more abstract Accuracy estimate, that of defining another 
person's strength from a forced choice list. This task proved to be too difficult. The 
lesson learned seems to be that the more abstract the Accuracy estimation, the greater the 
chance of poor results. If the task is comprised of mostly abstract components, it may be 
difficult to find a suitable accuracy measurement. There is a balance to be reached in 
finding an accuracy component that is not too simple (resulting in ceiling effects) or as 
was in this case, an accuracy component that is too difficult (resulting in floor effects). 
Perhaps accuracy questions should focus more on specific situations that a team may 
encounter. So given a certain situation, how would you expect Team Member A to 
react? . This may be a more fruitful approach to accuracy and merits further research. 
Researchers should also continue to pursue transactive memory work mindful of 
the consistent results of the field studies using only the Strength component. It may be 
that the ease of measurement, coupled with the predictive power of the Strength 
component, may render the more difficult collection of the other two components of 
transactive memory of little value. This could potentially provide practitioners with a 
simple tool to gauge team transactive memory levels quickly and efficiently. 
Alternatively, research should be pursued on inaccurate Strength estimation. A false or 
inaccurate sense of Strength could be detrimental. This situation could arise when 
members are in the same organization for a long period of time, but not on the same 
team. Once put on a team, the members may feel they know each other's strengths well, 
when in fact they do not. Would this be harmful? Members in this situation may 
actually take longer to figure out the· actual strengths of fellow crewmembers. 
Future research should be focused on potential boundary conditions of transactive 





memory. Perhaps transactive memory would be most value in novel, unusual, or crisis 
situations requiring flexibility on the part of the team. These non-routine situations may 
present several possible solutions and the team high in transactive memory may better 
gauge the best solution for that team. The team high in transactive memory may be 
better able to compensate for weaknesses in team by simply being aware that they exist. 
This would allow even a team with poor skill levels to perform better than they may 
otherwise. Furthermore, team high in transactive memory may be better able to select 
replacements for departing team members as they are acutely aware of the knowledge 
that has departed with the outgoing member. Certain tasks may moderate the importance 
of transactive memory to the team. In a similar vein the presence or absence of assigned 
team role may increase the importance of transactive memory. It is possible that teams 
without assigned roles would receive greater benefits from transactive memory as they 
may be more flexible in how they operate. 
Finally, research is needed on how to develop or build up transactive memory in 
a team. Time on the team is clearly one avenue to develop transactive memory. 
However, there may be further steps that a team can take. Rulke and Rau (1997) found 
that early in the team's life cycle, teams employ a strategy of small spiral encoding 
cycles of question-expertise-coordination. It seems that this practice would be beneficial 
for mature teams as well. Other group techniques such as Pulling apart Success 
exercises could also facilitate the development of transactive memory. Groups do not 
tend to re-assess themselves naturally, so this practice may require a team intervention. 
Another important time for such exercises may be when outgoing team members are 
replaced by newcomers. With arrivals and departures, this spiral encoding cycle could 
be beneficial. In groups with an assigned leader, the leader could institute such practices 
to increase the team's transactive memory and performance. 
Summary 
Taken as a whole, the results of these studies point to the positive relationship 
between transactive memory and performance. Though these effects were not 
exceptionally strong, a leader desiring to improve performance should take heed. 
Training teams in groups and keeping them together as much as possible during normal 
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real world functioning, should result in improved performance. Additionally, the 
powerful role of collective efficacy in determining performance in mature teams was 
highlighted. This performance difference may be what separates the "exceptional'' from 
the "average". Means to improve collective efficacy include increasing experience, 
ability, and the team's transactive memory. 
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Appendix A 
Training checklist for the pilot 
F-22 Simulator Training Checklist 
1. Conduct training on Fly Training: Dogfighting, Flight Model: Realistic , # enemy aircraft 3, Enemy 
skill level: Harmless. 
2. Review stick device 




-missile launch button 
-buttons on the joy stick 
2. Allow subject time to practice basic flight maneuvers 
left/right tum 
climb/decent 
3. Cover practice/evasive maneuvers. 
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split S (requires 6,000 ft.) to accomplish. Used when missile is (1 mi< missile< 2 mi) and 
coming from the 4 to 8 o'clock position. Or tum hard into the missile. Tum into missile coming from the 
front. 
4. Go over the Head's Up Display (HUD). 
Begin at the Heading indicator and go counterclockwise 
heading indicator 
airspeed is in Knots Indicated Airspeed or KIAS often referred to as indicated airspeed 
M=mach 
G = g's on the pilot. Grey/blackout can occur at greater than 6 sustained g's. -1.5 red-out 
A= AOA or Angle of Attack. Not important to this simulation 
F = Fuel (Not important) 
Weapon selected and number of weapons remaining 
AIM 120C good for 5-15 nautical miles Triangle sight 
AIM 9X good for within 5 nautical miles Circle sight 
G480 guns dashed circle sight (small circle= where bullets would hit 2,250' away) 
· NOTE each of these weapons brings up a different sight. Weapons will be further 
demonstrated later in the training period. 
Bottom center small triangle is the turn and slip indicator N/ A for this simulation 
Bottom right hand comer: #/type of waypoint, relative degrees to next waypoint and 
distance to waypoint in nautical miles 
Appendix A (Continued) 
Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) to next waypoint under current heading and airspeed. 
Target List 
Type of aircraft and position in the shootlist (in parentheses) 
altitude of enemy aircraft 
Heading and distance to enemy aircraft 
Bogies airspeed 
VC = closure speed of bogey 
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Altimeter in MSL (Mean Sea Level) also capable of giving Radar Altimeter by pushing Shift A 
key. MSL is fine for this simulation 
Missile range bar. Describe and emphasis having the dot in range before firing 
left bar: weapons effectiveness range, dot= bogey 
thin t bar: max possible range of weapon 
right bar: bogey's best weapon max range, arrow= your aircraft 
Also cover Shoot cue 
Shoot comes up in circle, dot indicates where the bogey is according to the missile's view. 
Heading bug 
5. Cover important keyboard keys 
* = afterburner 
B = Speed brake 
Below is important only if not using the throttle buttons 
Enter = toggles through the weapons 
S = brings up shootlist / changing weapons deletes shoot list 
T = toggles through the shoot list 
Tab = warp speed 
6. Practice a few air to air engagements. 
NOTE: ENSURE PILOT'S HEADS DOWN DISPLAY IS COVERED 
emphasize proper weapon selection 
emphasize how to bring up a shoot list 
emphasize the missile in range bar on the HUD 
emphasize the different sights (shapes), shoot cues, and target vector bar 
emphasize use of the HUD as the Head's Down Display will not be available. 
emphasize evasive maneuvers from incoming missiles and SAMs 
-must listen to advisor 
-split S and turns into the missile 
-what to do in case of black out ~ lessen the stick pressure or release depending on 
position 
Appendix A (Continued) 
7. Fill out a practice SA (situational awareness) form 
-wingmen are on the wing, unless sent elsewhere. 
-airspeed, altitude, and aircraft attitude. 
8. Review how to handle wingmen Hit U, ?, ? 
- wingmen, two on the right wing and one on the left unless sent elsewhere 
9. Begin the criterion test 
NOTE: ENSURE PILOT'S HEADS DOWN DISPLAY IS COVERED 
twice shooting down all three aircraft without being shot down 
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at least twice during the criterion test have them stop and verbally state what they would put on 
the SA form 
NOTE: recommend 25,000 ft on altitude (good for maneuvering) and 
hit E and V for auto chaff, flare, and ECM. 
BEGINNING THE MISSION 
1. What buttons for the mission "fly mission" ? 
2. Hit E, V for auto chaff, flare, and ECM 
3. Hit A for autopilot, TAB x 3 to go on warp speed times three. 
4. Once near the border, hit???? TAB to come out of warp speed 
5. Go on Pause (P button), fill out sim time on the form. 
AppendixB 
Situational Awareness Measures 
Time of test ______ (from F22 clock) 
NOTE All of the questions refer to the time since the last test 
Wingmen 
Twinkletoes 2 
Distance ____ _ 
Direction ____ _ 
Twinkletoes 3 
Distance. ____ _ 
Direction ____ _ 
Twinkletoes 4 
Distance ____ _ 
Direction ____ _ 
Bogies? (yin) __ 
Bogey 1, type ___ _ 
Distance ____ _ 
Direction ____ _ 
Bogey 2, type ___ _ 
Distance ____ _ 
Direction ____ _ 
Bogey 3, type. ___ _ 
Distance ____ _ 
Direction. ____ _ 
Bogey 4, type. ___ _ 
Distance ____ _ 
Direction. ____ _ 
Bogey 5, type. ___ _ 
Distance. ____ _ 
Direction. ____ _ 
Aircraft 
Altitude __ _ 
Attitude. ___ _ 
Speed. ___ _ 
Wpn selected. __ _ 
Weapons shot? (y/n), __ _ 
number ____ _ 
type _____ _ 
result. _____ _ 
Please turn the page 










............... __ {±20%) 
............... _{±30deg) 





............... __ (±20%) 
............... _(±20%) · 
Total questions __ 











Value of Communication Perception Measures 
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. DATA SHEET ViP2 
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, PILOT 
Date. ______ _ Time (real) ______ _ 
Trial number ______ _ 
Experimenter _______ _ 
Subject 1 (pilot) _____ _ 
Subject 2 (advisor) ____ -,--__ 
1) Trial start time (from F22 clock) _____ _ 
Mission description 
RESULTS 
Result _____ _ 
BOA. _____ _ 
Effectiveness __ _ 
Enemy ale ___ _ 
2) Mission end time 
(from F22 clock) 
Mission duration (2-1 ) ___ _ 
How ended ( crash, shot down etc) 
GROUP CODE 
AppendixE 
Videotape Coding Form 
Please rate each team on the following items based upon your observation of the videotapes. 
1. Please rate the degree to which members remembered different aspects of the task (e.g. 
location of bogies, location of wingmen, weapons selected, effectiveness of weapons, etc.) 









2. Please rate the degree to which individual team members were responsible for ( or focused 
on) different tasks within the mission. (e.g. avoiding ground threats, engaging the enemy, 
specific maneuvers, weapons selected, navigation, threat identification, etc.) 
1 2 3 
responsibility for 
tasks had little 
overlap 
4 5 6 7 
responsibility for 
tasks had a great 
deal of overlap 






with each other 
at all 
3 4 5 6 7 
team members 
coordinate with 
each other a 
great deal 
4. Please count the incidences of confusion (lack of understanding) in communication between 
team members 
[Note: clarification is not confusion] 
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Appendix E (Continue) 
5. Please rate the degree to which team members sequenced their communication effectively 




3 4 5 6 7 
Very effective 
sequencing 




3 4 5 6 7 
a great deal 
of cooperation 
7. Please rate the degree of trust (in judgment and ability) between team members 
NI A will get from the self-reports 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 
do not 
trust each 
other at all 
2 3 
trust each other 
a great deal 
8. Please rate the degree the amount of criticism (negative communication, can be tone of 
voice) between team members 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nonexistent occurred frequently 
9. Please rate the degree to which team members behaved (including non-verbals, sarcasm) as if 
they were frustrated with one another. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nonexistent occurred frequently 
10. Please rate the degree to which team members accepted procedural suggestions from one 
another. 
1 2 3 
Non-acceptance 
or heavy resistance 





Sample Crewmember Form Fairchild 
COPILOT'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
PLEASE COMPLETE INDIVIDUALLY! 
Date of Flight __ Call Sign __ 
Please circle the most accurate response or fill in the blank 
Background 
1. My crew position is AC Co 
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Nav Boom 
Appendix F (Continued) 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Responsibilities 
11. Which crewmember generally takes responsibility 
for maintaining and updating the weather 
information? 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Skills 
19. On this crew, the person most "expert" in his or her 



















Appendix F (Continued) 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Strengths 
23. How well do you know the strengths of this AC 
in his/her crew position? 
25. How well do you know the strengths of this 
Boom in his/her crew position? 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Strengths cont. 
26. If I had to pick one I would say that this AC' s 






Some Moderate Substantial As well as 
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge you can 
know them 
D D D D 
D D D D 
Crew Coordination Technical Systems and EP 
Proficiency ( e.g. knowledge(of 
landing, systems they are 
navigating, responsible for) 
refueling) 
D D D 
Appendix F (Continued) 
Please check the most 
appropriate box 
Performance 
47. How confident are you 
that at least one 
member of your crew 
will receive an 
"Outstanding 
Performance OP" or 
"Exceptionally 
Qualified EQ" rating 
on this checkride? 
50. Compared to the 
average crew, I think 
this crew's checkride 































Sample Evaluator Form 
CHECK NAVIGATOR'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
Date of Flight __ Call Sign __ 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Evaluation 
1. The following crewmember AC 
received checks on this 
flight.(circle all that apply) 
3. Taken as a crew, overall 
this crew's checkride 
performance was: NOTE: 
it is vital that you be 
accurate in your 
assessment. A void rating 
inflation and DO NOT 
firewall ratings. 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Nav Evaluation 
4. Taken as a individual, overall 
this individual's checkride 
performance was: NOTE: it is 
vital that you be accurate in 
your assessment. A void rating 

































D D D 
Crew Coordination Technical Proficiency Systems and EP 
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5. From my observations of the 
flight and evaluations on the 
ground, at the present time I 
rate this evaluatee's greatest 
strength as 
(e.g. landing, navigating, knowledge (of systems 
refueling) they are responsible for) 
Overall Checkride Result: EQ Q Q2 Q3 




Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 
University of Washington 
Seattle, Washington 
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The AMC DO has directed me to examine what makes an effective Air Force crew. I am an active duty Air 
Force Major and KC-135 pilot, currently working on a doctoral degree at the University of Washington. 
My dissertation focuses on aircrew effectiveness. 
I am specifically interested in aircraft with multiple crew positions. The KC-135 is an ideal aircraft for this 
study. The most efficient way to address this issue is through the use of a short questionnaire. All answers 
to the survey will be strictly confidential. The Air Force will never receive individual answers. Only group 
level information will be presented to the Air Force and the University of Washington. Call signs are 
requested in order to combine crew answers. 
Your honest and voluntary answers will help complete my aircrew effectiveness research and will also help 
the Air Force learn more about aircrew composition issues. 
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely 
//signed// 
Daryl R. Smith, Major, USAF 
School of Business Administration 
University of Washington 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Complete the individual survey for your crew position. 
2. Please fill out the survey individually, please do not discuss answers with one another. 
3. Place the individual survey back into the large envelope. 
4. Once all crewmembers have completed the survey please seal the envelope. 
5. Turn over the sheet to begin the survey. 
Appendix I 
Sample Crewmember Form Altus 
COPILOT'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
PLEASE COMPLETE INDIVIDUALLY! 
Date of Fli ht __ Call Si n __ 
Please circle the most accurate response or fill in the blank 
Background 
1. Reminder: This is the Copilot's 
questionnaire 
Please fill in the blank 
Experience with the Crew 
7. How many previous times have you flown 
with the Aircraft Commander assigned to 
this sortie 
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Appendix I (Continued) 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Responsibilities 
11. Which crewmember generally takes 
responsibility for maintaining and updating 
the weather information? 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Skills 
19. On this crew, the person most "expert" in his or 



















Appendix I (Continued) 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Strengths 
23. How well do you know the strengths of this AC 
in his/her crew position? 
25. How well do you know the strengths of this 
Boom in his/her crew position? 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Crew Strengths cont. 
26. Ifl had to pick one I would say that this AC's 




Some Moderate Substantial As well as 
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge you can 
D D D 
D D D 
Crew Coordination Technical 







Systems and EP 
knowledge(of 
systems they are 
responsible for) 
D 
Casual Some Moderate Substantial Know them 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Interpersonal Relations. 
Acquaintance Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge very well 
30. How well do you know the AC on a personal 
basis (off the job)? 
32. How well do you know the Nav on a 
personal basis ( off the job)? 
D D 
D D 
D D D 
D D D 
L 
Appendix I (Continued) 
Please check the most appropriate box 
Process Assessment 
41. Compared with the "average" crew (as 
far as smoothly and efficiently and 
cooperatively working together to 
accomplish the mission) this crew is 
more like the 
43. I feel other members of this crew are 

























Appendix I (Continued) 
Please check the most appropriate 
box 
Performance 
45. I think this crew has the 
knowledge needed to 
successfully complete 
this checkride. 
47. How confident are you 




of your crew will receive D D 
an "Outstanding 
Performance OP" or 
"Exceptionally Qualified 
EQ" rating on this 
checkride? 
49. How confident are you that 
no member of your crew 
will receive more than D 












Neutral Slightly Disagree Strongly 
Disagree Disgree 
D D D D 
D D D D D D 
D D D D D D 
VITA 
Daryl Raymond Smith 
University of Washington 
Graduate School of Business 
Dept. Of Management and Organization 
Box 353200 
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